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Donald E. Campbell*
ABSTRACT
The need to reclaim "civility" in the practice of law has become a rallying cry in
the profession. Lack of civility has been blamed on everything from an increase in
the cost of litigation to the cause of the public's lost faith in the legal profession.
Further, courts are increasingly willing to sanction a lawyer solely for "uncivil"
conduct. This article examines the puzzle of civility by addressing two fundamental
questions. First, what are the obligations of civility? This question is answered using
content analysis to analyze civility codes adopted by thirty-two state bar associations.
From this analysis ten core tenets of civility are identified which are common across
all jurisdictions. The second question addresses how civility is distinct from other
professional obligations, such as legal ethics and professionalism. Examining the
history and development of these professional obligations, this paper demonstrates
that civility is distinct and should be treated as a unique obligation of professional
responsibility.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The need to reclaim "civility" in the practice of law has become a rallying cry in
the profession. Lack of civility has been blamed on everything from an increase in
the cost of litigation to the cause of the public's lost faith in the legal profession.'
Claiming a causal connection between reduced civility and the ills of the legal
profession raises questions about the nature of civility and its place among the
professional responsibility obligations of lawyers. This article examines the puzzle of
civility by addressing two fundamental questions. First, what are the obligations of
civility? Second, how is civility distinct from other professional obligations of
lawyers, such as ethics and professionalism?
These questions have become particularly salient as civility has moved from an
aspirational goal to an enforceable norm. Citing the need for a return to "civility,"
courts have become increasingly willing to sanction lawyers solely for being uncivil.
An example is Sahyers v Prugh, Holliday & Karatinos.2 Sahyers, a paralegal, left
her job at a law firm and believed the firm owed her back pay for uncompensated
overtime. She retained an attorney who sued her former firm to recover the
overtime wages.4 The lawyer brought suit against the former firn without giving any
pre-suit notice. After discovery, the defendant law firm made an offer of judgment
for $3500 plus any attorney's fees or costs the court imposed.6 The plaintiff accepted
the offer, and her attorney sought $13,800 in attorney's fees and costs, to which the
defendant objected. After a hearing, the district court refused to award any fees even
though a prevailing plaintiff in a Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") case is
ordinarily entitled to reasonable fees and costs. The court held that the failure of the
attorney to contact the defendant law firm prior to filing suit was a "conscious
disregard for lawyer-to-lawyer collegiality and civility [which] caused ... the
judiciary to waste significant time and resources on unnecessary litigation and stood
in stark contrast to the behavior expected of an officer of the court." 9 On appeal, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of fees, citing the
district court's inherent "authority to police lawyer conduct and to guard and promote
1. Melissa S. Hung, Comment, A Non-Trivial Pursuit: The California Attorney
Guidelines of Civility and Professionalism, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1127, 1144 (2008).
2. Sahyers v. Prugh, Holliday & Karatinos, P.L., 560 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2009).
3. Id. at 1243.
4. Id.
5. See id at 1244, 1246 ("We do not say that pre-suit notice is usually required or
even often required under the FLSA to receive an award of attorney's fees or costs.").
6. Id. at 1243.
7. Id.; see also id. at 1244 ("In general, a prevailing FLSA plaintiff is entitled to an
award of some reasonable attorney's fees and costs.").
8. Sahyers, 560 F.3d at 1244 (construing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006)).
9. Id. at 1245.
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civility and collegiality among the members of its bar."10 Sahyers, and cases like it,
represent the increasing willingness of courts to sanction lawyers based solely on a
lack of "civility."
The increased attention to civility is not limited to the bench. In December 2007,
the Illinois Supreme Court Commission on Professionalism approved a study of
lawyers to ascertain how Illinois lawyers perceived civility.I1  The survey, which
sampled 1079 lawyers at random, was less than encouraging.12 Ninety-five percent
of the respondents stated that they had experienced or witnessed unprofessional
behavior throughout their careers.' 3 In fact, seventy-nine percent of the respondents
stated that they had experienced rudeness' 4 or strategic incivility' 5 within the last
month. Even aside from these specific claims of uncivil conduct, seventy-two
percent of respondents categorized incivility as a serious or moderately serious
problem in the profession.' 6
With its increasing importance, it is worth considering the nature and parameters
of the obligation of civility. This article proposes that civility must be considered a
unique obligation distinct from "ethics" and "professionalism," and sets out to
identify and define the core concepts of civility. To this end, Part II details the rise of
the civility movement. Part InI identifies ten overarching concepts of civility derived
from a content analysis of civility codes adopted by thirty-two state bar associations.
Finally, Part IV discusses how the obligations of civility are distinct from other
professional obligations, specifically legal ethics and professionalism.
II. THE DEATH OF CIvILITY AND THE RISE OF CIVILITY CODES
Before defining civility, it is helpful to trace the rise of the call for civility that led
to the adoption of civility codes' by state bar associations. Perhaps the most
10. Id. at 1244.
11. COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM, ILL. SUPREME COURT, SURVEY ON
PROFESSIONALISM: A STUDY OF ILLINOIS LAWYERS (2007), available at http://ilsccp.org/pdfs/
surveyonprofessionalism-final.pdf.
12. Id. at 4.
13. Id. at 21.
14. The survey defined "rudeness" to include "behavior such as displaying a
sarcastic or condescending attitude, swearing, verbal abuse or belittling language, and
inappropriate interruption of others." Id. at 22.
15. The survey defined "strategic incivility" to include "misrepresenting or stretching
the facts, playing hardball (such as not agreeing to reasonable requests for extensions),
indiscriminate or frivolous use of pleadings or motions, inflammatory writing in briefs or
motions, and inappropriate language or comments in letters or emails." Id. The survey
emphasized that this type of incivility is "designed to give a lawyer a leg up over opposing
counsel." Id.
16. COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 11, at 30.
17. The titles of these enactments vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. This article
uses the terms "civility codes" or "civility guidelines" generically, referencing these
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common argument is that civility once existed in the bar, but has eroded over time.
This was the central concern of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Texas, which stated in an opinion adopting a code of professionalism:
We address today a problem that, though of relatively recent origin, is so
pernicious that it threatens to delay the administration of justice and to place
litigation beyond the financial reach of litigants. With alarming frequency, we
find that valuable judicial and attorney time is consumed in resolving
unnecessary contention and sharp practices between lawyers. Judges and
magistrates of this court are required to devote substantial attention to refereeing
abusive litigation tactics that range from benign incivility to outright obstruction.
Our system of justice can ill-afford to devote scarce resources to supervising
matters that do not advance the resolution of the merits of a case; nor can justice
long remain available to deserving litigants if the costs of litigation are fueled
unnecessarily to the point of being prohibitive.
As judges and former practitioners from varied backgrounds and levels of
experience, we judicially know that litigation is conducted today in a manner far
different from years past. Whether the increased size of the bar has decreased
collegiality, or the legal profession has become only a business, or experienced
lawyers have ceased to teach new lawyers the standards to be observed, or
because of other factors not readily categorized, we observe patterns of behavior
that forebode ill for our system of justice. We now adopt standards designed to
end such conduct.19
enactments collectively. The first civility code was adopted in 1986 and the most recent was
enacted in 2007. Ctr. for Prof'1 Responsibility, Professionalism Codes, A.B.A.,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional-responsibility/resources/professionalism/pr
ofessionalism codes.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2011). With so many jurisdictions acting to
adopt civility codes, one would expect that there would be a uniform standard that
jurisdictions could modify. In fact, while some jurisdictions borrowed language from others,
developments have been made largely within the unique context of each jurisdiction. An
example of such a development is a report by the Maryland State Bar Association's
"Character Counts" Subcommittee that analyzes various civility codes adopted in the state
and identifies the common "indicia of professionalism." MD. STATE BAR Ass'N, IDENTIFYING
THE INDICIA OF PROFESSIONALISM: "CHARACTER COUNTs" SUBCOMMITTEE (2006), available
at http://www.courts.state.md.us/professionalism/pdfs/appendices/conduct
2 appl.pdf.
18. Jan Frankel Schau, Civility Amongst Lawyers: Does our Conduct Need the State
Bar's New Guidelines?, ORANGE COUNTY LAW., Mar. 2008, at 38, 38 ("[M]ost of us who
have been in practice for more than 20 years have witnessed a cultural shift to an apparent
acceptance of 'misbehavior' in the practice of law, in the treatment of clients and opponents,
and even in the casual demeanor seen in court and in mediations.").
19. Dondi Props. Corp. v. Commerce Savings & Loan Ass'n, 121 F.R.D. 284, 286
(N.D. Tex. 1988) (footnote omitted).
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The question of whether lawyer incivility is truly of "recent origin" is
debatable. 20 Some argue that, in fact, there was no Golden Age of civility, but instead
a time when the legal community was small, closed, and discriminatory.21 According
to this argument, civility was maintained by barring entry to those who would bring
diverse viewpoints to the bar.22
^ Regardless of how recent the rise of incivility may be, a number of authors
presume the existence of incivility and put forward rationales to explain its origins.
One argument is that the rise of incivility is a matter of ignorance on the part of both
23
lawyer and client who do not understand that civility is expected. 2 Others argue that
lawyers, being the product of an individualistic and uncivil society, will be uncivil
20. See Act of 1402, 4 Hen. 4, c. 18 (Eng.) (noting the problem of "sundry damages
and mischiefs that have ensued before this time to divers persons of the realm by a great
number of attornies, ignorant and not learned in the law, as they were wont to be before this
time," and thus mandating that all attorneys be "examined by the justices" and found to "be
good and virtuous, and of good fame"), as quoted in State v. Cannon (In re Cannon), 240
N.W. 441, 446 (Wis. 1932), and ORIE L. PHILLIPS & PHILBRICK MCCOY, CONDUCT OF
JUDGES AND LAWYERS 9 (1952), and Ross L. Malone, The Lawyer and His Professional
Responsibilities, 17 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 191, 195 (1960); see also Ashley Cockrill, The
Shyster Lawyer, 21 YALE L.J. 383, 383 (1912) (tracing the long history of the "shyster
lawyer"); Book Note, 21 HARV. L. REV. 553, 554 (1908) (reviewing GEORGE SHARSWOOD,
AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (Phila., T. & JW. Johnson Co. 5th ed. 1884), reprinted
in 32 REPORTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (1907)) ("[T]oday lawyers are often
actually objects of public distrust. This fall of the profession from the high prestige of the
past has been accomplished by the influx of many who seek admission to the bar mainly for
its emoluments."); T.L. Edelen, Ideals of a Lawyer, Address Before Students of the
University of Kentucky College of Law (Mar. 11, 1925), in 14 Ky. L.J. 3, 4 (1925) ("I regret
very much to say that in the years which have elapsed since I have begun the practice of law,
there has been a vast change in the ideals which measure the conduct of lawyers in their
dealings with their clients, with their fellow lawyers and with the courts. Certain principles
... which were regarded, within my memory, as elementary, have gradually changed in their
apparent obligation and I think we no longer measure our obligations by the same standards
which were in vogue forty or fifty years ago.").
21. Robert Stevens, Democracy and the Legal Profession: Cautionary Notes,
LEARNING & L., Spring 1976, at 12, 16.
22. Jack T. Camp, Thoughts on Professionalism in the Twenty-First Century, 81
TUL. L. REV. 1377, 1380-81 (2007) ("Not only has the bar become more diverse, but its
numbers have significantly increased as more and more lawyers enter the profession. As
these changes occur, the bar reflects the vast array of traditions, cultures, and ethical and
moral norms of its members and agreeing to a uniform definition of professionalism
becomes impossible.").
23. Bronson D. Bills, To Be or Not to Be: Civility and the Young Lawyer, 5 CONN.
PUB. INT. L.J. 31, 35 (2005) ("'[T]he tradition of civility that used to be transmitted to young
lawyers is [now] gone."' (quoting Thomas E. Humphrey, 'Civil'Practice in Maine, ME. B.J.,
Winter 2005, at 6, 7)); Hung, supra note 1, at 1145 ("Both attorneys and clients need to be
educated about what constitutes acceptable behavior.").
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themselves. 24 Another explanation is that law firms, where a young lawyer often
learns his or her values, foster incivility.25 Underlying this rationale is the belief that
law firms create a culture where finding and retaining work, billing, and collecting
fees result in a narrow focus on winning at all costs, and thus, the sacrifice of
civility.26 Continuing the litany of explanations, some point to the "imbalance" in a
lawyer's view of her role in the legal process.27 Lawyers who view their dutie as
primarily to their client-as opposed to the integrity of the legal system as a whole-
increase incivility in the bar.28
Some point to demographic factors, such as the "decline in lawyers' wages [and]
... the growth in the percentage of lawyers in the population" as contributing
causes.29 Prevalence of lawyer advertising has also received blame,3 0 as has the
failure of law schools to provide an adequate model of civility for students.31 Still
others argue that the increasingly non-local nature of the legal practice increases
24. COMM. ON CIVILITY, SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, FINAL REPORT (1992), in 143
F.R.D. 441, 445 (1992) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]; see also Thomas Gibbs Gee & Bryan A.
Garner, The Uncivil Lawyer: A Scourge at the Bar, 15 REV. LITIG. 177, 184 (1995) (noting
that the counterculture of the 1960s "may have left its mark in a subtle way, by attacking the
etiquette of our judicial system, which had previously been accepted with a simple and
widespread approval").
25. Marvin E. Aspen, A Response to the Civility Naysayers, 28 STETsON L. REv. 253,
255 (1998).
26. Mark D. Nozette & Robert A. Creamer, Professionalism: The Next Level, 79
TuL. L. REV. 1539, 1547-48 (2005).
27. Id at 1545 ("[T]he civility crisis was a clear example of an imbalance among the
separate roles of lawyers as professionals. In the case of incivility, it involved lawyers
justifying their behavior as required by their duty to their clients.").
28. Id; Gee & Garner, supra note 24, at 185 ("Clients often encourage uncivil
behavior. And they are perhaps doing so now more than ever because lawyers are so
numerous and so visible in everyday life. Lawyers as a class have lost a mystique that they
once enjoyed-and that often means more overt pressure from clients.");
29. Jonathan Macey, Occupation Code 541110: Lawyers, Self-Regulation, and the
Idea of a Profession, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1079, 1079 (2005).
30. Eugene R. Gaetke, Expecting Too Much and Too Little ofLawyers, 67 U. PITr. L.
REV. 693, 712-13 (2006).
31. Id; Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, The Necessity for
Civility, Address Before the American Law Institute (May 18, 1971), in LITIGATION, Winter
1975, at 8, 10. In his address, then Chief Justice Burger noted the importance of law
professors in developing civility:
I suggest this is relevant to law teachers because you have the first and best
chance to inculcate in young students of the law the realization that in a very hard
sense the hackneyed phrase 'order in the court' articulates something very basic to
the mechanisms of justice. Someone must teach that good manners, disciplined
behavior and civility-by whatever name-are the lubricants that prevent
lawsuits from turning into combat. More than that [civility] is really the very glue
that keeps an organized society from flying apart.
Id.
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incivility because3 2 (1) with an increased market area, a lawyer is less likely to deal
repeatedly with the same players, and there is less cost to attorneys who act uncivilly
because they will likely not interact with opposing counsel on a regular basis;33 (2)
the expanded market increases the out-of-court interactions (such as depositions)
between lawyers without commensurate supervision by courts or other regulatory
bodies;34 and (3) the increase in the heterogeneity of the bar has led to less
camaraderie among lawyers and a corresponding decrease in civility.35 Yet this is
only a partial list of the alleged culprits of practitioner incivility; indeed, the causes
are seemingly endless.36
Those citing to one of the foregoing as a cause of the rise of incivility call for an
enforcement mechanism to reclaim civility.37 Others, however, are skeptical of the
civility movement and see the effort as motivated by the self-interest of a select few
to keep the bar as insulated as possible. For example, Professor Amy R. Mashburn
argues that civility codes are attempts by an increasingly isolated legal elite to impose
their values on other lawyers that they consider less prestigious.
With the range of reactions to the supposed decline in civility, perhaps the only
agreement is that there is a perception that something called "civility" is alleged to be
lacking in lawyers today. Those who argue that a decline in civility has occurred
assert that it has more than theoretical consequences. They argue that a decrease in
civility results in an increase in litigation costs-an uncivil lawyer opposes every
suggestion of her opponent, delays resolution of the claim, and incurs additional fees
in the process.39  Costs are also imposed on judicial resources because frivolous
32. Macey, supra note 29, at 1080.
33. Gee & Garner, supra note 24, at 181-82; Macey, supra note 29, at 1080.
34. Jonathan J. Lerner, Putting the "Civil" Back in Civil Litigation, N.Y. ST. B.J.,
Mar.-Apr. 2009, at 33, 34 ("Whether it is because clients expect obnoxious tactics to
advance their interests, or because some lawyers believe they help to achieve better results,
or because the Bar, especially in large cities, has grown so competitive and impersonal, our
civility and professionalism seem to be continually declining and at a rapid pace."); Macey,
supra note 29, at 1080.
35. Gee & Garner, supra note 24, at 182-83; Macey, supra note 29, at 1080.
36. See Hung, supra note 1, at 1133 ("Other culprits of incivility within the
profession include frequent malpractice suits, decreased mentoring, inadequate training,
greater misuse of discovery, commercialization of law practice, and increased competition
for clients. Decreased client loyalty, the intrusion of accounting firms and other businesses
into conventional legal arenas, and the changing role of law in our society are contributing
external factors." (footnotes omitted)); see also Gee & Garner, supra note 24, at 183
(positing that increases in the use of technology create distance between lawyers and
increase the likelihood of incivility).
37. See Gee & Garner, supra note 24, at 192-93.
38. Amy R. Mashburn, Professionalism as Class Ideology: Civility Codes and Bar
Hierarchy, 28 VAL. U. L. REv. 657, 663 (1994).
39. FINAL REPORT, supra note 24, at 445 ("When a lawyer behaves uncivilly,
contentiously opposing everything his opponent proposes, both litigants suffer because they
must pay even higher attorneys' fees and the disposition of the case is delayed.").
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motions and unmeritorious conduct require frequent intervention by judicial
officers.4 0 The cumulative effect harms the profession's image in the eyes of the
public.41
The current method for addressing incivility is through the education of
lawyers. An education in civility allows lawyers to change the culture by acting in a
civil manner and mentoring young lawyers to do the same.43 The first step in this
process was the adoption of standards of civility by courts and bar associations.44
This introduction of civility codes as teaching tools is similar to the introduction of
the Canons of Ethics in 1908,'45 which were not originally adopted as disciplinable
obligations, but rather as means to inform new lawyers of the ethics of the
46
profession. To this end, the stated purpose of civility codes is to "clarify and to
articulate important values held by many members of the bench and the bar" by
placing expected standards of civility in one document.4 7 These civility standards are
not meant to be a substitute for ethical codes, but to "impose obligations above and
beyond the minimum requirements" of ethical rules.48 As one author noted, the
40. Josh O'Hara, Note, Creating Civility: Using Reference Group Theory to Improve
Inter-Lawyer Relations, 31 VT. L. REV. 965, 970 (2007) ("Lawyers who act uncivilly not
only sully their reputations but also waste judicial resources.... Frivolous Rule 11 motions
are a prime example of how incivility can cost time and money. As discussed earlier, a
frequent and favorite tactic of uncivil lawyers is to bring frivolous motions, specifically Rule
11 motions, to delay and hinder discovery.").
41. John A. Humbach, The National Association of Honest Lawyers: An Essay on
Honesty, "Lawyer Honesty " and Public Trust in the Legal System, 20 PACE L. REv. 93, 93
(1999) ("Our basic civic order relies on the legal system and public respect for it. If the
public cannot trust the lawyers who are entrusted with the legal system, there is a problem
that casts a shadow on the integrity of the very concept of rule of law."); O'Hara, supra note
40, at 968 ("Among the problems that can result from the adversarial excesses are losses of
credibility, a waste of judicial resources, and a serious loss of public esteem for the legal
profession in general." (footnotes omitted)).
42. See Gee & Garner, supra note 24, at 185, 196.
43. See id. at 194-96.
44. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
45. CANONS OF ETHICS (1908), in 33 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 575 (1908). Over the years,
the Canons of Ethics have commonly been called the Canons of Professional Ethics,
although that is not an official name. Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican
Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241, 241 n.7 (1992).
46. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
47. FINAL REPORT, supra note 24, at 446.
48. Mashburn, supra note 38, at 684; see also O'Hara, supra note 40, at 972 (arguing
that civility codes, unlike the Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct, do more than outline the
minimum standards of professional conduct, but also instruct attorneys on how to conduct
themselves among other professionals); Christopher J. Piazzola, Comment, Ethical Versus
Procedural Approaches to Civility: Why Ethics 2000 Should Have Adopted a Civility Rule,
74 U. COLO. L. REv. 1197, 1235 (2002) (noting the danger of conflicting obligations that
may arise from a dual system of professional ethics with ethical rules on the one hand and
civility codes on the other hand).
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purpose of the codes is to provide "unifying, clarifying, and anchoring standards" that
articulate "best practices" or "values" for practitioners. 49 This recognition that the
obligations of civility are not commiserate with ethical obligations is important. For
example, a lawyer's ethical obligation to zealously pursue a client's interests may be
inconsistent with the obligation to cooperate and to forego certain advantages that
may arise in the course of litigation.50
The concern that lawyers may feel ethically constrained by civility codes has not
gone unnoticed. Sanctioning lawyers for incivility runs the risk of chilling zealous
advocacy.51 A lawyer who is afraid of incurring sanctions for acting in an uncivil
manner is likely to refrain from commenting, even if the statement is true and would
be in the client's best interests. 52 This makes a clearly delineated set of civility
concepts crucial to ensure that lawyers know what is and is not allowed under the
nomenclature of civility.
III. IDENTIFYING CORE CONCEPTS OF CivILIY
With conflicting views on the presence and value of the civility movement, it is
helpful to understand what is commonly meant by the term "civility." This part thus
defines the core aspects of civility. These concepts are distilled from the unique
codifications of guidelines of civility adopted by bar associations in thirty-two
states. Analyzing these codes provides both a challenge and an opportunity. First, it
49. Hung, supra note 1, at 1152.
50. Piazzola, supra note 48 (proposing that ethical rules incorporate an enforceable
obligation to treat others with respect); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl.
(2009) ("As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the
adversary system.").
51. See Alice Woolley, Commentary, Does Civility Matter?, 46 OSGOOD HALL L.J
175, 175-76, 179-82 (2008).
52. See id.
53. Only state civility codes available online were utilized. The following is a listing
of the jurisdictions and the civility codes analyzed: (1) ALA. STATE BAR CODE OF PROF'L
COURTESY (Ala. State Bar 1992), available at http://www.alabar.org/members/professional
courtesy.cfm; (2) A LAWYER'S CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM OF THE STATE BAR OF ARIZ.
(State Bar of Ariz. 2005), available at http://www.azbar.org/membership/admissions/law
yer'screedofprofessionalism; (3) CAL. ATr'Y GUIDELINES OF CIVILITY & PROFESSIONALISM
(State Bar of Cal. 2007), available at http://nevadacountycourts.com/documents/public/Cal
Bar/o20Guidelines%20of/20Civility.pdf; (4) LAWYERS' PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONALISM
(Conn. Bar Ass'n 1994), available at https://www.ctbar.org/Sections%20Committees/Comm
ittees/StandingCommitteeOnProfessionalism/LawyersPrincipleOfProfessionalism.aspx; (5)
PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONALISM FOR DEL. LAWYERS (Del. State Bar Ass'n 2003), available
at http://courts.state.de.us/forms/download.aspx?id=39428; (6) LAWYER'S CREED &
ASPIRATIONAL STATEMENT ON PROFESSIONALISM (State Bar of Ga. 1990), available at
http://www.gabar.org/related organizations/chiefjusticescommission on professionalism/
lawyers-creed/; (7) GUIDELINES OF PROF'L COURTESY & CIVILITY FOR HAw. LAWYERS (Haw.
State Bar Ass'n 2004), available at http://www.state.hi.us/jud/ctrules/gpcc.pdf; (8)
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is a challenge because, for the most part, each of these jurisdictions has adopted
unique, jurisdiction-specific codes, so it is impossible to identify one civility code as a
model. The idiosyncratic nature of the codes, however, provides an opportunity to
identify those concepts that are consistent across all jurisdictions.
Content analysis was used to identify these concepts. First, the thirty-two civility
codes were identified and located. The American Bar Association
STANDARDS FOR CIVILITY IN PROF'L CONDUCT (Idaho State Bar 2001), available at http://isb.
idaho.gov/pdf/general/standards-for-civility.pdf; (9) HALLMARKS OF PROFESSIONALISM
(Kan. Bar Ass'n 1987), available at http://www.ksbar.org/pdf/hallmarks.pdf; (10) CODE OF
PROF'L COURTESY (Ky. Bar Ass'n 1993), available at http://www.kybar.org/228; (11) CODE
OF PROFESSIONALISM (La. State Bar Ass'n 1992), available at http://www.1sba.org/2007
InsideLSBA/professionalismcode.asp; (12) MD. STATE BAR ASS'N CODE OF CIVILITY (Md.
State Bar Ass'n 1997), available at http://www.msba.org/departments/commpubl/publica
tions/code.htm; (13) STATEMENT ON LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM (Mass. Bar Ass'n 1989),
available at http://www.massbar.org/media/725247/final%20statement%20on%201awyer%
20professionalism.pdf; (14) PROFESSIONALISM ASPIRATIONS (Minn. State Bar Ass'n 2001),
available at http://www2.mnbar.org/committees/professionalism/aspirations-final.htm; (15)
A LAWYER'S CREED (Miss. Bar Ass'n 1990), available at http://www.msbar.org/admin/
spotimages/2027.pdf; (16) TENETS OF PROF'L COURTESY (Mo. Bar 1987), available at http://
members.mobar.org/ssf2010-course-materials/pdfs/tenetsof professionalcourtesywillenb
rock lynch.pdf; (17) PLEDGE OF PROFESSIONALISM (Clark Cnty., Nev. Bar Ass'n 1997),
available at http://www.clarkcountybar.org/index.php?option=com content&task-view&id
=22&Itemid=181; (18) LITIG. GUIDELINES (N.H. Bar Ass'n 1999), available at http://www.
nhbar.org/uploads/pdf/litguide(1).pdf; (19) PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONALISM (N.J. State Bar
Ass'n 1997), available at http://www.njsba.com/resources/njcop/njcop-principle-prof.html;
(20) CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM (State Bar of N.M. 1989), available at http://www.
nmbar.org/Attomeys/creed.html; (21) GUIDELINES ON CIVILITY IN LITIG. (N.Y. State Bar
Ass'n 1994), available at http://www.nynd.uscourts.gov/documents/CivilityinLitigationA
VoluntaryCommitment.pdf, (22) N.C. LAWYER PROF'L CREED (N.C. Bar Ass'n 1989),
available at http://www.ncbar.org/media/124544/lawyerscreed.pdf; (23) A LAWYER'S
ASPIRATIONAL IDEALS (Supreme Court of Ohio 1997), available at http://www.sconet.
state.oh.us/publications/proldeals.pdf, (24) STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM (Okla. Bar
Ass'n 2006), available at http://www.okbar.org/ethics/standards.htm; (25) STATEMENT OF
PROFESSIONALISM (Or. State Bar 2006), available at http://www.osbar.org/_docs/forms/Prof-
ord.pdf; (26) 204 PA. CODE § 99.3 (2011), available at http://www.pacode.com/secure/
data/204/chapter99/subchapDtoc.html; (27) S.C. BAR STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM (S.C.
Bar 2011), available at http://scbar.org/public/files/docs/professionalismstandards.pdf; (28)
TEX. LAWYER'S CREED-A MANDATE FOR PROFESSIONALISM (Supreme Court of Tex. & Tex.
Court of Criminal Appeals 1989), available at http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/pdf/
TexasLawyersCreed.pdf, (29) UTAH STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM & CIVILITY (Utah
Supreme Court 2003), available at http://www.utcourts.gov/courts/sup/civility.htm; (30)
GUIDELINES OF PROF'L COURTESY (Vt. Bar Ass'n 1989), available at http://www.vtbar.org/
Upload%20Files/attachments/guidelinesofprofessionalcourtesy.pdf; (31) PRINCIPLES OF
PROFESSIONALISM FOR VA. LAWYERS (Va. Bar Ass'n 2009), available at http://www.vsb.org/
docs/2009-10-pg-professionalism.pdf; (32) CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM (Wash. State Bar
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("ABA") maintains an updated listing of all civility codes and provides hyperlinks to
those codes that are available online.54 After gathering the codes, each code was
analyzed and the provisions for each jurisdiction were placed into a chart divided by
the overarching concern of each provision. As provisions arose that did not fit into a
preexisting category, a new category was added. After the initial analysis was
completed, the collected provisions were analyzed to determine which provisions
were common across all jurisdictions. These common provisions provided the basis
of the core common concepts of civility discussed below.
Analysis of the data gathered from the civility codes indicates that the most
common provisions can be categorized into ten overarching themes. Although some
codes have more detail than others, the goal here is to distill the common aspects of
civility across jurisdictions. The ten common concepts include the obligation to (1)
recognize the importance of keeping commitments and of seeking agreement and
accommodation with regard to scheduling and extensions; (2) be respectful and act in
a courteous, cordial, and civil manner; (3) be prompt, punctual, and prepared; (4)
maintain honesty and personal integrity; (5) communicate with opposing counsel; (6)
avoid actions taken merely to delay or harass; (7) ensure proper conduct before the
court; (8) act with dignity and cooperation in pre-trial proceedings; (9) act as a role
model to the client and public and as a mentor to young lawyers; and (10) utilize the
court system in an efficient and fair manner. Each of these concepts is discussed in
detail below.15
A. Recognize the Importance ofKeeping Commitments and ofSeeking Agreement
andAccommodation with Regard to Scheduling and Extensions
Codes provide detailed obligations regarding keeping commitments and seeking
accommodation with opposing counsel when scheduling or rescheduling matters or
seeking extensions. The general obligation is to agree only to commitments that the
lawyer reasonably believes she can honor.56 In addition to ensuring her availability,
the lawyer must also ensure that others involved in the proceeding are available
before scheduling an event.57 This includes scheduling matters by agreement (as
opposed to mere notice), and refraining from requesting scheduling changes for
54. See Ctr. for Prof'1 Responsibility, supra note 17.
55. The concepts identified are overarching themes found in all codes. Specific
codes address these themes in different ways. The code provisions cited in this section of
the paper were selected as exemplars of particular concepts.
56. See ALA. STATE BAR CODE OF PROF'L COURTESY § 2 ("A lawyer must honor
promises and commitments made to another lawyer."); STATEMENT ON LAWYER
PROFESSIONALISM art. 1, subdiv. B(2) (Mass. Bar Ass'n) ("A lawyer should not accept
professional commitments which he or she knows or should know he or she will be unable to
honor.").
57. See ALA. STATE BAR CODE OF PROF'L COURTESY § 3 ("A lawyer should make all
reasonable efforts to schedule matters with opposing counsel by agreement.").
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tactical or unfair purposes. Agreement is particularly important on procedural
matters, preliminary matters, discovery issues, and dates for meetings, depositions,
and trial. 9 The justification for emphasizing agreement is to ensure that lawyer and
court resources are expended on matters of substance, and not on delays caused by
failure to coordinate schedules or procedural disputes. 60
In addition to scheduling by agreement, a lawyer should seek to accommodate
61opposing counsel throughout representation. This includes accommodations with
regard to meetings, depositions, hearings, and trial.62 Proper accommodation
includes granting requests for extensions of time and for waiver of procedural
formalities, even if the same courtesy has not previously been extended to the
63
lawyer. Accommodation should be granted unless such an accommodation will
58. See CODE OF PROF'L COURTESY § 3 (Ky. Bar Ass'n) ("A lawyer should respect
opposing counsel's schedule by seeking agreement on deposition dates and court
appearances (other than routine motions) rather than merely serving notice.");
PROFESSIONALISM ASPIRATIONS art. III cmt. C(l) (Minn. State Bar Ass'n) ("We will not
arbitrarily schedule a meeting, deposition, court appearance, hearing, or other proceeding
until a good faith effort has been made to schedule it by agreement. If we are unable to
contact the other lawyer, we will send written correspondence suggesting a time or times that
will become operative unless an informal objection is directed to us within a set reasonable
time."); PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONALISM: LAWYER'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNSEL
Princ. 2 (N.J. State Bar Ass'n) ("A lawyer should respect a colleague's schedule. Agreement
should be sought on dates for meetings, conferences, depositions, hearings, trials and other
events.").
59. See ALA. STATE BAR CODE OF PROF'L COURTESY § 9 ("A lawyer should seek
informal agreement on procedural and preliminary matters.").
60. See PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONALISM FOR VA. LAWYERS Princ. 4 (Va. Bar Ass'n
2009) ("In my conduct toward opposing counsel, I should ... [c]ooperate as much as
possible on procedural and logistical matters, so that the clients' and lawyers' efforts can be
directed toward the substance of disputes or disagreements."); A LAWYER'S ASPIRATIONAL
IDEALS: AS TO THE COURTS & OTHER TRIBUNALS, AND TO THOSE WHO ASSIST THEM subdiv.
a(3) (Supreme Court of Ohio 1997) ("I should ... [s]eek noncoerced agreement between the
parties on procedural and discovery matters . . . ."); CODE OF PROFESSIONALISM para. 10 (La.
State Bar Ass'n 1992) ("I will cooperate with counsel and the court to reduce the cost of
litigation and will readily stipulate to all matters not in dispute.").
61. See A LAWYER'S CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM OF THE STATE BAR OF ARIZ. subdiv.
B (State Bar of Ariz. 2005).
62. See id. subdiv. B(4) ("I will endeavor to consult with opposing counsel before
scheduling depositions and meetings and before rescheduling hearings, and I will cooperate
with opposing counsel when scheduling changes are requested .... .").
63. See CAL. ATT'Y GUIDELINES OF CIVILITY & PROFESSIONALISM § 6 (State Bar of
Cal. 2007) ("Unless time is of the essence, an attorney should agree to an extension without
requiring motions or other formalities, regardless of whether the requesting counsel
previously refused to grant an extension."); PLEDGE OF PROFESSIONALISM art. II, § 2 (Clark
Cnty., Nev. Bar Ass'n 1997) ("I will agree to reasonable requests for extensions of time and
for waiver of procedural formalities when the legitimate substantive interests of my client
will not be adversely affected. . . .").
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adversely affect the client." The decision to grant an accommodation to opposing
counsel with regard to matters that do not directly affect the merits of the case (for
example, extensions, continuances, adjournments, and admissions of facts) rests with
the lawyer and not the client. It is improper to withhold consent to accommodation
or extensions on arbitrary or unreasonable bases, or to place unwarranted or irrelevant
conditions when granting an extension of time.66
B. Be Respectful andAct in a Courteous, Cordial, and Civil Manner
Civility codes use various terms to describe a lawyer's obligation to remain
courteous to those involved in the legal system. The codes use combinations of
words such as "courteous," "cordial," "respectful," "fair," or "civil."67 The obligation
64. See A LAWYER'S CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM OF THE STATE BAR OF ARIz. subdiv.
B(3) ("In litigation proceedings, I will agree to reasonable requests for extensions of time or
for waiver of procedural formalities when the legitimate interests of my client will not be
adversely affected . . . ."); PROFESSIONAL ASPIRATIONS art. III cmt. H (Minn. State Bar Ass'n
2001) ("During trial or hearing we will honor reasonable requests of opposing counsel that
do not prejudice the rights of our clients or sacrifice tactical advantage.").
65. See STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM § 2.5 (Okla. Bar Ass'n 2006) ("We will
reserve the right to determine whether to giant accommodations to opposing counsel in all
matters that do not adversely affect a client's lawful objectives."); UTAH STANDARDS OF
PROFESSIONALISM & CIVILITY No. 14 (Utah Supreme Court 2003) ("Lawyers shall advise
their clients that they reserve the right to determine whether to grant accommodations to
other counsel in all matters not directly affecting the merits of the cause or prejudicing the
client's rights, such as extensions of time, continuances, adjournments, and admissions of
facts."); TEX. LAWYER'S CREED-A MANDATE FOR PROFESSIONALISM art. II, § 10 (Supreme
Court of Tex. & Tex. Court of Criminal Appeals 1989) ("A client has no right to instruct me
to refuse reasonable requests made by other counsel.").
66. See GUIDELINES ON CIVILITY IN LITIG. art. III, subdiv. C (N.Y. State Bar Ass'n
1994) ("A lawyer should not attach unfair and extraneous conditions to the extension of
time. A lawyer is entitled to impose conditions appropriate to preserve rights that an
extension might otherwise jeopardize or to seek reciprocal scheduling concessions.");
GUIDELINES OF PROF'L COURTESY para. 10 (Vt. Bar Ass'n 1989) ("If a fellow attorney makes
a just request for cooperation, or seeks scheduling accommodation, a lawyer shall not
arbitrarily or unreasonably withhold consent.").
67. CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM para. 2 (Wash. State Bar Ass'n 2001) ("In my
dealings with lawyers, parties, witnesses, members of the bench, and court staff, I will be
civil and courteous and guided by fundamental tenets of integrity and fairness."); ALA.
STATE BAR CODE OF PROF'L COURTESY § 4 (Ala. State Bar 1992) ("A lawyer should
maintain a cordial and respectful relationship with opposing counsel."); CODE OF
PROFESSIONALISM para. 4 (La. State Bar Ass'n 1992) ("1 will conduct myself with dignity,
civility, courtesy and a sense of fair play."); GUIDELINES OF PROF'L COURTESY para. 5 (Vt.
Bar Ass'n) ("Lawyers should treat each other, their clients, the opposing parties, the courts,
and members of the public with courtesy and civility and conduct themselves in a
professional manner at all times.").
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of courteousness extends to other lawyers, clients, the court, office staff, the public,
and even the law.6 It applies to written and oral communications.69
Courteous behavior is often defined by its opposite. For example, South
Carolina provides that "[a] lawyer should avoid all rude, disruptive, and abusive
behavior and should, at all times, act with dignity, decency and courtesy consistent
with any appropriate response to such conduct by others and a vigorous and
aggressive assertion to appropriately protect the legitimate interests of a client., 70
Courteousness requires a losing lawyer to avoid expressing disrespect for the court,
adversaries, or parties.71 Alabama's code goes so far as to say that, to demonstrate
courteousness, lawyers should shake hands at the conclusion of a matter.72
A number of codes imply that incivility may arise because a lawyer adopts the
client's dislike or disapproval of others in the proceeding.73 Specifically, codes make
it clear that a lawyer should maintain their objective independence in the course of
68. See PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONALISM FOR VA. LAWYERS Princ. 3 (Va. Bar Ass'n
2009) ("In my conduct toward courts and other institutions with which I deal, I should ...
[t]reat all judges and court personnel with respect and courtesy."); PLEDGE OF
PROFESSIONALISM art. III, § 1, art. IV, § 3 (Clark Cnty., Nev. Bar Ass'n) ("I will conduct
myself in a professional manner and demonstrate respect for the court, other tribunals and
the law.. . . I will treat my office staff with courtesy and respect, and will encourage them
to treat others in the same manner. . . .").
69. See STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM § 3.1(a) (Okla. Bar Ass'n) ("We will be
civil, courteous, respectful, honest and fair in communicating with adversaries, orally and in
writing."); A LAWYER'S CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM OF THE STATE BAR OF ARIz. subdiv.
B(1) ("I will be courteous and civil, both in oral and in written communication. . . ."); CODE
OF PROF'L COURTESY § 8 (Ky. Bar Ass'n 1993) ("A lawyer should strive to maintain a
courteous tone in correspondence, pleadings and other written communications.").
70. S.C. BAR STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM Princ. 6 (S.C. Bar 2011).
71. See CAL. ATT'Y GUIDELINES OF CIVILITY & PROFESSIONALISM intro., paras. 1-2
(State Bar of Cal. 2007); PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONALISM FOR DEL. LAWYERS Princ. A(4)
(Del. State Bar Ass'n 2003).
72. See ALA. STATE BAR CODE OF PROF'L COURTESY § 10 ("When each adversarial
proceeding ends, a lawyer should shake hands with the fellow lawyer who is the adversary;
and the losing lawyer should refrain from engaging in any conduct which engenders
disrespect for the court, the adversary or the parties.").
73. See A LAWYER'S CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM OF THE STATE BAR OF ARIZ. subdiv.
A(l) ("I will be loyal and committed to my client's cause, but I will not permit that loyalty
and commitment to interfere with my ability to provide my client with objective and
independent advice . . . ."); see also PROFESSIONALISM ASPIRATIONS art. II cmt. A(1) (Minn.
State Bar Ass'n 2001) ("We will be loyal and committed to our clients' lawful objectives, but
will not permit that loyalty and commitment to interfere with our duty to provide objective
and independent advice."); TEX. LAWYER'S CREED-A MANDATE FOR PROFESSIONALISM art.
II, § 3 (Supreme Court of Tex. & Tex. Court of Criminal Appeals 1989) ("1 will be loyal and
commited [sic] to my client's lawful objectives, but I will not permit that loyalty and
commitment to interfere with my duty to provide objective and independent advice.").
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representation.74 Lawyers should not allow "ill feelings" between the parties to affect
the actions of the lawyer.
The lawyer's obligation of courteousness extends beyond the obligation of a
lawyer to regulate his or her own conduct. It also includes a duty on the part of the
lawyer to educate clients and others, such as office staff, of the importance of civility
in the legal process.76 Part of this education includes explaining to the client that
courteous conduct "does not reflect a lack of zeal in advancing [the client's] interests,
but rather is more likely to successfully advance their interests."77 The recurring
theme is that lawyers should inform their clients that weakness does not necessarily
follow from courtesy and civility, and ensure that clients understand that "uncivil,
rude, abrasive, abusive, vulgar, antagonistic, obstructive, or obnoxious" behavior is
not a valid part of effective or zealous representation.78 Minnesota goes even further
74. See PLEDGE OF PROFESSIONALISM art. 1, § 5 (Clark Cnty., Nev. Bar Ass'n 1997)
("I will not permit my commitment to my client's cause to interfere with my ability to
provide my client with objective advice."); see also S.C. BAR STANDARDS OF
PROFESSIONALISM Princ. 9 (S.C. Bar) ("A lawyer should exercise independent judgment
without compromise of a client and should not be governed by a client's ill will or deceit.");
A LAWYER'S ASPIRATIONAL IDEALS: As TO CLIENTS subdiv. b(3) (Supreme Court of Ohio
1997) ("1 should . . . [m]aintain the sympathetic detachment that permits objective and
independent advice to clients.").
75. PROFESSIONALISM ASPIRATIONS art. III (Minn. State Bar Ass'n 2001) ("As
professionals, ill feelings between the clients should not influence our conduct, attitude, or
demeanor toward opposing counsel."); see also PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONALISM FOR VA.
LAWYERS Princ. 4 (Va. Bar Ass'n 2009) ("In my conduct toward opposing counsel, I should
... [r]esist being affected by any ill feelings opposing clients may have toward each other,
remembering that any conflict is between the clients and not between the lawyers."); UTAH
STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM & CIVILITY No. 1 (Utah Supreme Court 2003) ("Lawyers
shall advance the legitimate interests of their clients, without reflecting any ill-will that
clients may have for their adversaries, even if called upon to do so by another.");
GUIDELINES OF PROF'L COURTESY para. 7 (Vt. Bar Ass'n 1989) ("In adversary proceedings,
clients are litigants and though ill feelings may exist between clients, such ill feelings should
not influence a lawyer's conduct, attitude, or demeanor toward opposing lawyers.").
76. See PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONALISM: LAWYER'S RELATIONS WITH CLIENTS Princ.
4 (N.J. State Bar Ass'n 1997) ("Clients should be advised that professional courtesy, fair
tactics, civility, and adherence to the rules and law are compatible with vigorous advocacy
and zealous representation.").
77. PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONALISM FOR VA. LAWYERS Princ. 2.
78. STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM § 2.7 (Okla. Bar Ass'n 2006) ("We understand,
and will impress upon our client, that reasonable people can disagree without being
disagreeable; and that effective representation does not require, and in fact is impaired by,
conduct which objectively can be characterized as uncivil, rude, abrasive, abusive, vulgar,
antagonistic, obstructive or obnoxious."); see also A LAWYER'S CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM
OF THE STATE BAR OF ARIZ. subdiv. A(5) ("I will advise my client that civility and courtesy
are not to be equated with weakness . . .. "); UTAH STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM &
CIVILITY No. 2 ("Lawyers shall advise their clients that civility, courtesy, and fair dealing are
expected. They are tools for effective advocacy and not signs of weakness. Clients have no
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to state that "uncivil, abrasive, abusive, hostile, or obstructive" conduct undermines
the rational, peaceful, and efficient resolution of disputes-the very attributes of an
effective legal system. 79
C. The Obligation to be Prompt, Punctual, and Prepared
Civility includes obligations of promptness, punctuality, 0 and preparedness.
Underlying these elements are issues of efficiency and respect for those involved in a
proceeding. A lawyer who is not prompt, punctual, or prepared wastes the time and
resources of those involved (including the judicial system), and also demonstrates
disrespect.82
A lawyer should be punctual in attendance at events that occur in the course of
proceedings, as well as in communications with clients, with other attorneys, and
with the court.83 The duty of promptness applies to all aspects of litigation.84 in its
85
most general sense, a lawyer has an obligation to promptly dispose of disputes. In a
right to demand that lawyers abuse anyone or engage in any offensive or improper
conduct."); PROFESSIONALISM ASPIRATIONS art. II cmt. A(4) (Minn. State Bar Ass'n) ("We
will advise our clients, if necessary, that they do not have a right to demand that we engage
in abusive or offensive conduct and we will not engage in such conduct."); GUIDELINES ON
CIVILITY IN LITIG. art. I, subdiv. B (N.Y. Bar Ass'n 1994) ("Lawyers can disagree without
being disagreeable. They should recognize that effective representation does not require
antagonistic or acrimonious behavior."); CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM: LAWYER'S CREED
subdiv. B (State Bar of N.M 1989); PLEDGE OF PROFESSIONALISM art. I, § 4 (Clark Cnty.,
Nev. Bar Ass'n) (providing the same as above); TEX. LAWYER'S CREED-A MANDATE FOR
PROFESSIONALISM art. II, § 4 ("I will advise my client that civility and courtesy are expected
and are not a sign of weakness.").
79. PROFESSIONALISM ASPIRATIONS art. III (Minn. State Bar Ass'n).
80. See PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONALISM FOR VA. LAWYERS Princ. 3 ("In my conduct
toward courts and other institutions with which I deal, I should . . . [b]e punctual in attending
all court appearances and other scheduled events."); ALA. STATE BAR CODE OF PROF'L
COURTESY § 8 (Ala. State Bar 1992) ("A lawyer should always be punctual.").
81. STATEMENT OF PROFESSIONALISM para. 11 (Or. State Bar 2006) ("I will always be
prepared for any proceeding in which I am representing my client.").
82. See MD. STATE BAR Ass'N CODE OF CIVILITY: LAWYERS' DUTIES § 8 (Md. State
Bar Ass'n 1997) ("We will be punctual and prepared for all scheduled appearances so that
all matters may begin on time and proceed efficiently.").
83. CODE OF PROFESSIONALISM para. 11 (La. State Bar Ass'n 1992) ("I will be
punctual in my communications with clients, other counsel and the court, and in honoring
scheduled appearances.").
84. See STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM § 1.9 (Okla. Bar Ass'n 2006) (providing
that an attorney should promptly return telephone calls to clients and others); A LAWYER'S
CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM OF THE STATE BAR OF ARIz. subdiv. C(7) (State Bar of Ariz.
2005) (providing that an attorney should promptly notify the court and opposing counsel of
any scheduling matters).
85. See STATEMENT ON LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM art. I, subdiv. D(5) (Mass. Bar
Ass'n 1989) ("A lawyer should be guided by the proposition that the interests of justice are
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more specific sense, it obligates a lawyer to respond in a timely manner to
communications from clients, opposing counsel, or others involved in the legal
86
process. It is improper for a lawyer to fail to promptly respond to a communication
merely to seek tactical advantage or solely because the lawyer disagrees with the
communication. 8 In addition, a lawyer has an obligation to promptly notify all those
interested if a scheduled hearing, deposition, or other event has been cancelled.88
A lawyer's obligation to be prepared requires adequate preparation by the lawyer
prior to hearings, trials, depositions, and other commitments.8 A lawyer must remain
educated with regard to the area of law in which she practices.90 This obligation has
two primary justifications. First is the need to ensure that the client maintains respect
for her lawyer and the legal system. Second, without proper preparation, an attorney
leaves her client underrepresented and compromises the adversarial, truth-seeking
process underlying the legal system.9 1
best served by the prompt disposition of disputes."); N.C. LAWYER PROF'L CREED: COURTESY
TOWARD OTHER COUNSEL para. 3 (N.C. Bar Ass'n 1989) ("If a lawyer knows that his client
is going to submit a voluntary dismissal of a matter, the lawyer should promptly notify
opposing counsel to avoid unnecessary trial preparation and expense.").
86. See STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM § 1.9 (Okla. Bar Ass'n) ("We will promptly
return telephone calls and respond to correspondence from clients, opposing counsel,
unrepresented parties and others."); CODE OF PROF'L COURTESY § 2 (Ky. Bar Ass'n 1993)
("A lawyer should promptly return telephone calls and correspondence from other
lawyers.").
87. PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONALISM FOR VA. LAWYERS Princ. 4 (Va. Bar Ass'n
2009) ("In my conduct toward opposing counsel, I should ... [return telephone calls, e-
mails and other communications as promptly as I can, even if we disagree about the subject
matter of the communication, resolving to disagree without being disagreeable.").
88. A LAWYER'S CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM OF THE STATE BAR OF ARIz. subdiv.
C(7) ("When scheduled hearings or depositions have to be canceled, I will notify opposing
counsel and, if appropriate, the court (or other tribunal) as early as possible . . . .").
89. PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONALISM FOR DEL. LAWYERS Princ. A(5) (Del. State Bar
Ass'n 2003) (addressing attorney diligence by providing that "[a] lawyer should expend the
time, effort, and energy required to master the facts and law presented by each professional
task").
90. STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM § 2.4 (Okla. Bar Ass'n) ("We will continually
engage in legal education and recognize our limitations of knowledge and experience.").
91. PROFESSIONALISM ASPIRATIONS art. II (Minn. State Bar Ass'n 2001) ("A lawyer
owes allegiance, learning, skill, and industry to a client. As lawyers, we shall employ
appropriate legal procedures to protect and advance our clients' legitimate rights, claims, and
objectives. In fulfilling our duties to each client, we will be mindful of our obligation to the
administration of justice, which is a truth-seeking process designed to resolve human and
societal problems in a rational, peaceful, and efficient manner.").
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D. Maintain Honesty and Personal Integrity
Civility codes admonish lawyers to maintain integrity and to be honest.
Delaware explicitly identifies personal integrity as a lawyer's most important quality
and states that personal integrity is maintained by "rendering ... professional service
of the highest skill and ability; acting with candor; preserving confidences; treating
others with respect; and acting with conviction and courage in advocating a lawful
cause." 92 While other codes mention the obligation to maintain "integrity," none give
this type of detailed explanation.93
With regard to honesty, several codes state that a lawyer's word is her bond.94
While honesty, as a general matter, is mentioned repeatedly,95 the codes cite
specifically the obligation to avoid intentionally deceiving other lawyers and the
court. For example, a lawyer should refrain from misciting, distorting, or
exaggerating facts or the law and should correct inadvertent misstatements of law or
fact.96 Oklahoma states that it is dishonest for a lawyer to exaggerate "the amount of
92. PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONALISM FOR DEL. LAWYERS Princ. A(1).
93. The following statement is common among civility codes: "As a lawyer, I will
aspire ... [t]o preserve the dignity and integrity of our profession by my conduct. The
dignity and integrity of our profession is an inheritance that must be maintained by each
successive generation of lawyers." A LAWYER'S CREED: ASPIRATIONAL IDEALS AS A LAWYER
subdiv. g (Miss. Bar Ass'n 1990); see also CAL. ATr'Y GUIDELINES OF CIVILITY &
PROFESSIONALISM intro., para. 1 (State Bar of Cal. 2007) (stating that the obligation of
professionalism includes "civility, professional integrity, personal dignity, candor, diligence,
respect, courtesy, and cooperation"); STATEMENT OF PROFESSIONALISM para. 1 (Or. State Bar
2006) ("1 will promote the integrity of the profession and the legal system.");
PROFESSIONALISM ASPIRATIONS art. I (Minn. State Bar Ass'n 2001) ("A lawyer owes
personal dignity, integrity, and independence to the administration of justice. A lawyer's
conduct should be characterized at all times by personal courtesy and professional integrity
in the fullest sense of those terms."); GUIDELINES OF PROF'L COURTESY para. 4 (Vt. Bar Ass'n
1989) ("A lawyer should act with personal dignity and professional integrity.").
94. Jurisdictions that expressly state a lawyer's word is her bond include Louisiana,
Minnesota, Nevada, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and Washington. S.C. BAR
STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM Princ. 10 (S.C. Bar 2011); PRINCIPLES OF
PROFESSIONALISM FOR VA. LAWYERS Princ. 1 (Va. Bar Ass'n 2009); STANDARDS OF
PROFESSIONALISM § 1.2 (Okla. Bar Ass'n); PROFESSIONALISM ASPIRATIONS art. I cmt. B
(Minn. State Bar Ass'n); CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM para. 3 (Wash. State Bar Ass'n 2001);
PLEDGE OF PROFESSIONALISM art. II, § 1 (Clark Cnty., Nev. Bar Ass'n 1997); CODE OF
PROFESSIONALISM intro. note (La. State Bar Ass'n 1992); TEX. LAWYER'S CREED-A
MANDATE FOR PROFESSIONALISM art. I, § 1 (Supreme Court of Tex. & Tex. Court of
Criminal Appeals 1989).
95. See CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM para. 8 (Wash. State Bar Ass'n) ("I will be
forthright and honest in my dealings with the court, opposing counsel and others.").
96. MD. STATE BAR Ass'N CODE OF CIVILITY: LAWYERS' DUTIES § 7 (Md. State Bar
Ass'n 1997) ("We will not knowingly misrepresent, mischaracterize, or misquote fact or
authorities cited.").
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damages sought in a lawsuit, actual or potential recoveries in settlement or the
lawyer's qualifications, experience or fees."97
E. Proper Interactions with Opposing Counsel
Codes provide detailed guidance with regard to common interactions between
lawyers.9 The key to evaluating inter-lawyer interactions is whether the interaction
is geared toward legitimately resolving a dispute, or is instead intended to gain an
unfair advantage or personally attack an opponent. 99 Underlying this concept is a
belief that open, fair, respectful, and honest communication between opposing
lawyers will not only assist in quickly resolving litigated disputes, but will also help
avoid litigating some disputes all together.100 On the other hand, failure of lawyers to
interact civilly can delay resolution of claims and compromise the public's view of
the legal profession 1
Lawyers ought to "avoid hostile, demeaning, or humiliating words in written and
oral communications" to opposing counsel.102 Lawyers should also avoid personal
criticism of other lawyers and statements made solely to embarrass, including
statements or insinuation related to "personal peculiarities or idiosyncrasies" of other
lawyers. 0 3 Kentucky sees this problem as lawyers becoming too personally involved
97. STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM § 1.8 (Okla. Bar Ass'n).
98. See A LAWYER'S CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM OF THE STATE BAR OF ARIZ. subdiv.
B (State Bar of Ariz. 2005) (offering guidance on communication, litigation, scheduling
hearings, discovery, and negotiations); CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM paras. 6-7 (State Bar
Ass'n) (discussing the manner, timing, and scheduling of hearings, as well as professional
conduct during negotiations, depositions, and other interactions with opposing counsel).
99. See, e.g., GUIDELINES ON CIVILITY IN LITIG.. art. III (N.Y. Bar Ass'n 1994) ("A
lawyer should respect the schedule and commitments of opposing counsel, consistent with
protection of the clients' interests.").
100. A LAWYER'S CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM OF THE STATE BAR OF ARIZ. subdiv.
C(2) ("Where consistent with my client's interests, I will communicate with opposing
counsel in an effort to avoid litigation and to resolve litigation that has actually commenced
. . . ."); ALA. STATE BAR CODE OF PROF'L COURTESY § 11 (Ala. State Bar 1992) ("A lawyer
should recognize that adversaries should communicate to avoid litigation and remember their
obligation to be courteous to each other."); STATEMENT ON LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM art. II,
subdiv. A(a)-(b) (Mass. Bar Ass'n 1989) ("[A] lawyer should ... maintain open
communication with opposing counsel [and] communicate respectfully with other attorneys
101. STATEMENT ON LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM art. I, subdiv. A(4) (Mass. Bar Ass'n)
("Lawyers and judges should deal with one another respectfully because the attitude of the
public toward the judicial process is influenced by the relationship among lawyers and
judges.").
102. UTAH STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM & CIviLITY No. 3 (Utah Supreme Court
2003).
103. 204 PA. CODE § 99.3(5) (2011) ("A lawyer should abstain from making
disparaging personal remarks or engaging in acrimonious speech or conduct toward
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in their client's case and acting inappropriately toward other lawyers. Kentucky's
advice is to leave the conflict in the courtroom: "A lawyer should recognize that the
conflicts within a legal matter are professional and not personal and should endeavor
to maintain a friendly and professional relationship with other attorneys in the matter.
In other words, 'leave the matter in the courtroom."'
104
In situations where lawyers exchange documents, they should identify changes
made to the document, and, when changes are agreed to, the lawyers must make only
the agreed changes.105  Furthermore, when communicating understandings or
agreements, a lawyer must state the agreement correctly and should not include
substantive matters in the document that were not previously agreed upon.106
Similarly, a lawyer should not set out in a communication a position that opposing
counsel "has not taken, thus creating a record of events that have not occurred." 07
With regard to the need to communicate fairly, Utah, Texas, and Minnesota require
lawyers, when practical, to notify the other side before seeking an entry of default.108
Finally, the obligation to communicate civilly includes the delivery of the
communication. Thus, when it is appropriate to send communications to a court, a
opposing counsel or any participants in the legal process and shall treat everyone involved
with fair consideration."); ALA. STATE BAR CODE OF PROF'L COURTESY § 7 ("A lawyer
should never intentionally embarrass another lawyer and should avoid personal criticism of
another lawyer."); TEX. LAWYER'S CREED-A MANDATE FOR PROFESSIONALISM art. III, § 10
(Supreme Court of Tex. & Tex. Court of Criminal Appeals 1989) ("I will abstain from any
allusion tospersonal peculiarities or idiosyncrasies of opposing counsel.").
104. CODE OF PROF'L COURTESY § 10 (Ky. Bar Ass'n 1993).
105. CODE OF PROFESSIONALISM para. 3 (La. State Bar Ass'n 1992) ("I will clearly
identify for other counsel changes I have made in documents . . . .").
106. UTAH STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM & CIVILITY No. 7 ("When committing
oral understandings to writing, lawyers shall do so accurately and completely. They shall
provide other counsel a copy for review, and never include substantive matters upon which
there has been no agreement, without explicitly advising other counsel. As drafts are
exchanged, lawyers shall bring to the attention of other counsel changes from prior drafts.").
107. See STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM § 3.1(d) (Okla. Bar Ass'n 2006); see also
CAL. ATr'Y GUIDELINES OF CIVILITY & PROFESSIONALISM § 4(g) (State Bar of Cal. 2007)
("An attorney should not create a false or misleading record of events or attribute to an
opposing counsel a position not taken.").
108. See UTAH STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM & CIVILITY No. 16 ("Lawyers shall
not cause the entry of a default without first notifying other counsel whose identity is known,
unless their clients' legitimate rights could be adversely affected."); PROFESSIONALISM
ASPIRATIONS art. III cmt. F(2) (Minn. State Bar Ass'n 2001) ("We will not cause a default or
dismissal to be entered, when we know the identity of an opposing counsel, without first
making a good faith attempt to inquire about the counsel's intention to proceed."); TEX.
LAWYER'S CREED-A MANDATE FOR PROFESSIONALISM art. III ("I will not take advantage,
by causing any default or dismissal to be rendered, when I know the identity of an opposing
counsel, without first inquiring about that counsel's intention to proceed.").
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lawyer should, if ossible, deliver copies to opposing counsel at the same time and by
the same means.)9
A lawyer should not seek sanctions or disqualification of opposing counsel
unless the action is necessary to protect a client and is fully justified after
investigation.'o This recognizes that a motion for sanctions can destroy the working
relationships between lawyers and encourage tit-for-tat uncivil conduct."' Motions
seeking sanctions or disqualification filed solely for tactical advantage or other
improper reasons are not appropriate. 12 Threats of sanctions are also inappropriate
as a litigation tactic." 3 Lawyers who engage in such tactics bring the legal profession
into disrepute by advancing unfounded arguments.l14
F. Avoid Actions Taken Merely to Delay or Harass
A fundamental tenet of civility is the engagement in fair and efficient litigation or
negotiation. " This means lawyers should take steps to avoid costs, delay,
inconvenience, and strife-that is, tactics that do not aid in truth-finding or the timely
and efficient resolution of disputes." 6 Actions taken solely to delay or to harass, or to
gain an unfair advantage in litigation, reflect poorly on the legal profession in the eyes
of the public. In fact, advocacy does not include the right of unjustified delay or
109. See PROFESSIONALISM ASPIRATIONS art. III cmt. F(1) (Minn. State Bar Ass'n).
110. ALA. STATE BAR CODE OF PROF'L COURTESY § 5 (Ala. State Bar 1992) ("A
lawyer should seek sanctions against opposing counsel only where required for the
protection of the client and not for mere tactical advantage.").
111. CAL. Arr'Y GUIDELINES OF CIVILITY & PROFESSIONALISM § 10(f) ("Because
requests for monetary sanctions, even if statutorily authorized, can lead to the destruction of
a productive relationship between counsel or parties, monetary sanctions should not be
sought unless fully justified by the circumstances and necessary to protect a client's
legitimate interests and then only after a good faith effort to resolve the issue informally
among counsel.").
112. UTAH STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM & CIVILITY No. 5 ("Lawyers shall not
lightly seek sanctions and will never seek sanctions against or disqualification of another
lawyer for any improper purpose.").
113. CODE OF PROFESSIONALISM para. 9 (La. State Bar Ass'n 1992) ("I will not use the
threat of sanctions as a litigation tactic.").
114. MD. STATE BAR Ass'N CODE OF CIVILITY: LAWYERS' DUTIES § 4 (Md. State Bar
Ass'n 1997) ("We will not bring the profession into disrepute by making unfounded
accusations of impropriety or attacking counsel, and absent good cause, we will not attribute
bad motives or improper conduct to other counsel.").
115. See PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONALISM: LAWYER'S RELATIONS WITH THE COURT
Princ. 1 (N.J. State Bar Ass'n 1997) ("A lawyer has a duty to act in a manner consistent with
the proper functioning of a fair, efficient, and humane system ofjustice.").
116. See PROFESSIONALISM ASPIRATIONS art. III (Minn. State Bar Ass'n 2001)
("Conduct that may be characterized as uncivil, abrasive, abusive, hostile, or obstructive
impedes the fundamental goal of resolving disputes rationally, peacefully, and efficiently.").
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harassment.l17 This obligation essentially places a duty of good faith and fair dealing
on lawyers in the course of litigation or negotiation.118
Civility codes provide specific examples of conduct that either results in or
avoids delay and harassment. Lawyers should not seek an extension of time solely to
delay resolution of a matter.' 19 Similarly, lawyers should not "falsely hold out the
possibility of settlement" to delay resolution of a matter20 To avoid such delays,
lawyers should stipulate to civil matters not in dispute and withdraw claims or
defenses when it becomes clear to the lawyer that they have no merit.121 Improper
delay occurs when a lawyer refuses to consider an opportunity to resolve a dispute by
settlement or alternative dispute resolution.122
A lawyer should not engage in conduct designed to harass opposing counsel and
opposing counsel's client. Of course this means in the most literal sense that lawyers
should "not engage in personal attacks" on opposing counsel or others in the judicial
process.123 Harassment, however, also includes conduct in which the sole purpose is
not to resolve a claim, but merely to annoy or impose additional costs on those
involved in the litigation process. Thus, a lawyer should not engage in conduct solely
for the purpose of "drain[ing] the financial resources of the opposing party."l 24 A
117. ALA. STATE BAR CODE OF PROF'L COURTESY §§ 12-13 (Ala. State Bar 1992) ("A
lawyer should recognize that advocacy does not include harassment.. .. A lawyer should
recognize that advocacy does not include needless delay.").
118. See PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONALISM: LAWYER'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER
COUNSEL Princ. 4 (N.J. State Bar Ass'n) ("In the conduct of negotiations, or litigation, a
lawyer should conduct himself or herself with dignity and fairness and refrain from conduct
meant to harass the opposing party.").
119. PROFESSIONALISM ASPIRATIONS art. III cmt. C(4) (Minn. State Bar Ass'n) ("We
will not request an extension of time solely for the purpose of unjustified delay or to obtain a
tactical advantage.").
120. Id. art. Ill cmt. G(2) ("We will not falsely hold out the possibility of settlement as
a means to adjourn discovery or to delay trial.").
121. See STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM § 2.9 (Okla. Bar Ass'n 2006) ("We will
readily stipulate to undisputed facts in order to avoid needless costs, delay, inconvenience,
and strife."); LAWYERS' PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONALISM para. 22 (Conn. Bar Ass'n 1994)
("In civil matters, I will stipulate to facts as to which there is no genuine dispute .... ).
122. STATEMENT OF PROFESSIONALISM para. 14 (Or. State Bar 2006) ("I will explore
all legitimate methods and opportunities to resolve disputes at every stage in my
representation of my client.").
123. CODE OF PROFESSIONALISM para. 8 (La. State Bar Ass'n 1992) ("I will not engage
in personal attacks on other counsel or the court."); see also PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONALISM
FOR VA. LAWYERS Princ. 4 (Va. Bar Ass'n 2009) ("In my conduct toward opposing counsel,
I should . .. [a]void ad hominem attacks, recognizing that in nearly every situation opposing
lawyers are simply serving their clients as I am trying to serve my clients.");
PROFESSIONALISM ASPIRATIONS art. III cmt. A(6) (Minn. State Bar Ass'n) ("We will not ask a
witness or an opposing party a question solely for the purpose of harassing or embarrassing
that individual.").
124. PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONALISM: LAWYER'S RELATIONS WITH CLIENTS Princ. 3
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lawyer also should not serve motions or pleadings on an opposing party at a time or
in a manner that unfairly limits the opportunity to respond, for example, "late on
Friday afternoon or the day preceding a . .. holiday.',1
25
G. Ensure Proper Conduct Before the Court
A lawyer's obligation of civility extends to conduct before the court and is two-
fold: First, a lawyer should respect the court and the system of justice for which it
stands.126 Second, a lawyer should be a model for clients and others in showing
respect for the role of courts in the legal system.' 27 By protecting and respecting the
dignity, integrity, and independence of the judiciary, lawyers help maintain the
legitimacy of the legal system as a whole.' 28 Further, a lawyer's display of civil
conduct helps ensure that other participants in the legal process also maintain due
respect for the judiciary and the symbolism associated with the legal process.129
At the most fundamental level, a lawyer should act with respect and deference
when interacting with the bench. Some civility codes provide detailed examples of
what is expected. For example, Alabama states that a lawyer should "dress in proper
(N.J. State Bar Ass'n 1997) ("Clients should be advised against pursuing a course of action
that is without merit, and should avoid tactics that are intended to harass, or drain the
financial resources of the opposing party.").
125. GUIDELINES ON CIVILITY IN LITIG. art. V, subdiv. B (N.Y. State Bar Ass'n 1994);
see also STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM § 3.1(c) (Okla. Bar Ass'n) ("The timing and
manner of service of papers will not be designed to annoy, inconvenience or cause
disadvantage to the person receiving the papers; and papers will not be served at a time or in
a manner designed to take advantage of an adversary's known absence from the office.");
LAWYERS' PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONALISM para. 13 (Conn. Bar Ass'n) ("I will not serve
motions and pleadings on the other party or counsel at such time or in such manner as will
unfairly limit the other party's opportunity to respond . . . .").
126. PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONALISM: LAWYER'S RELATIONS WITH THE COURT Princ. I
(N.J. State Bar Ass'n) ("To the court, a lawyer owes honesty, respect, diligence, candor and
punctuality. A lawyer has a duty to act in a manner consistent with the proper functioning of
a fair, efficient, and humane system of justice.").
127. See PROFESSIONALISM ASPIRATIONS art. IV cmt. A(4) (Minn. State Bar Ass'n)
("We will not engage in any conduct that brings disorder or disruption to the courtroom or
administrative hearing area. We will advise our clients and witnesses appearing in these
settings of the proper conduct expected and required there and, to the best of our ability,
prevent our clients and witnesses from creating disorder or disruption.").
128. MD. STATE BAR Ass'N CODE OF CIVILITY: LAWYERS' DUTIES § 6 (Md. State Bar
Ass'n 1997) ("We will not engage in conduct that offends the dignity and decorum of
judicial and administrative proceedings, bring [sic] disorder to the tribunal or undermines the
image of the legal profession, nor will we allow clients or witnesses to engage in such
conduct.").
129. TEX. LAWYER'S CREED-A MANDATE FOR PROFESSIONALISM art. IV, § 1
(Supreme Court of Tex. & Tex. Court of Criminal Appeals 1989) ("1 will always recognize
that the position of judge is the symbol of both the judicial system and administration of
justice. I will refrain from conduct that degrades this symbol.").
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attire" and should stand when addressing the court. 130 Pennsylvania goes further to
provide specific direction to lawyers appearing before a court, stating that a lawyer
should be courteous to the court and court personnel.' 3 ' This includes addressing the
judge as "Your Honor" or "the Court" and by beginning an argument with "May it
please the court.l32 Pennsylvania adds that while in court, "lawyer[s] should refer to
opposing counsel by [their] surname preceded by the[ir] preferred title."'3 Generally
stated, a lawyer should act in a manner that respects the court and its decisions.134
A lawyer "should avoid visual [and] verbal displays of temper toward the court
[and bench]," especially when the lawyer is on the losing side of a matter.' 3 5
Furthermore, when appearing before a court, a lawyer should direct her arguments to
the court, not opposing counsel, and should avoid embarrassing or personal criticism
of opposing counsel or the court. In addition, a lawyer should avoid "unfounded,
unsubstantiated, or unjustified public criticism"' 37 of the judiciary, and should
actively protect the court system "from unjust criticism and attack." 38
Obligations to courts extend beyond the duty of decorum and the appearance of
the court; they also extend to substantive concerns. Lawyers should communicate
130. ALA. STATE BAR CODE OF PROF'L COURTESY §§ 16-17 (Ala. State Bar 1992) ("A
lawyer should stand to address the court, be courteous and not engage in recrimination with
the court... . During any court proceeding, whether in the courtroom or chambers, a lawyer
should dress in proper attire to show proper respect for the court and the law.").
131. 204 PA. CODE § 99.3(13) (2011).
132. Id.
133. Id. at § 99.3(12). North Carolina also gives specific guidance to lawyers in the
courtroom:
A lawyer in the courtroom should do the following whenever reasonably possible:
[(1)] avoid interruption of opposing counsel except when necessary to voice an
objection. [(2)] unless otherwise directed by the court, present an exhibit to
opposing counsel before presenting the exhibit to a witness. [(3)] avoid standing
between the witness and opposing counsel during examination. [(4)] provide
opposing counsel with a copy of any opinion or document given to the court.
[(5)] encourage appropriate courtroom behavior by clients and witnesses.
N.C. LAWYER PROF'L CREED: COURTESY TOWARD OTHER COUNSEL para. 6 (N.C. Bar Ass'n
1989).
134. TEX. LAWYER'S CREED-A MANDATE FOR PROFESSIONALISM art. IV, § 7 ("I will
respect the rulings of the Court.").
135. N.C. LAWYER PROF'L CREED: COURTESY TOWARD THE COURT para. 7 (N.C. Bar
Ass'n) ("A lawyer should avoid visual or verbal displays of temper toward the court, and
especially upon a bench ruling against him.").
136. 204 PA. CODE § 99.3(13).
137. A LAWYER'S CREED: ASPIRATIONAL IDEALS AS TO THE COURTS, OTHER
TRIBUNALS, & TO THOSE WHO ASSIST THEM subdiv. b(5) (Miss. Bar Ass'n 1990).
138. PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONALISM: LAWYER'S RELATIONS WITH THE COURT Princ. 4
(N.J. State Bar Ass'n 1997) ("A lawyer should strive to protect the dignity and independence
of the judiciary, particularly from unjust criticism and attack."); see also TEX. LAWYER'S
CREED-A MANDATE FOR PROFESSIONALISM art. IV ("Lawyers and judges are equally
responsible to protect the dignity and independence of the Court and the profession.").
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honestly with the court on factual and legal issues because the court is relying on the
lawyer's representations when resolving disputes.'39 For example, if a court requests
a lawyer to draft an order, the lawyer should draft the order in a manner that correctly
states the court's holding, should circulate the order to opposing counsel, and should
seek to resolve issues before presenting the order to the court.140 In addition, a lawyer
must not engage in improper ex parte contacts with members of the judiciary.141
The obligation of the lawyer to inform clients and others about the needs to
demonstrate deference and respect to the court, and to act to prevent clients and
witnesses from disturbing courtroom decorum, is the second element of a lawyer's
obligation to ensure proper conduct before courts. 142 This duty actually has two
different components. The first is an obligation not to advise a client to engage in
143conduct that demonstrates disrespect for the court. The second is a requirement to
educate those involved in the legal process about the obligation of demonstrating
respect for the court and explaining what conduct is expected.'" Washington State's
Creed ofProfessionalism puts the obligation succinctly:
As an officer of the court, as an advocate and as a lawyer, I will uphold the
honor and dignity of the court and of the profession of law. I will strive always
to instill and encourage a respectful attitude toward the courts, the litigation
process and the legal profession.145
139. STATEMENT ON LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM art. I, subdiv. D(1) (Mass. Bar Ass'n
1989) ("A lawyer should conduct himself or herself in a manner which recognizes that the
judge is obligated to resolve conflicting claims and must rely, in large measure, upon the
lawyer for the representation of evidence to be used in resolving disputes; accordingly, a
lawyer should strive to ensure that the judge is not burdened with a misapprehension of fact
or law.").
140. HILLSBOROUGH CNTY. STANDARDS OF PROF'L COURTESY subdiv. H(3).
141. MD. STATE BAR Ass'N CODE OF CIVILITY: LAWYERS' DUTIES § 10 (Md. State Bar
Ass'n 1997) ("We will avoid ex parte communications with the court, including the judge's
staff, on pending matters in person (whether in social, professional, or other contexts), by
telephone, and in letters and other forms of written communication, unless authorized.").
142. PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONALISM FOR VA. LAWYERS Princ. 3 (Va. Bar Ass'n
2009) ("In my conduct toward courts and other institutions with which I deal, I should
... [e]xplain to my clients that they should also act with respect and courtesy when dealing
with courts and other institutions."); MD. STATE BAR Ass'N CODE OF CIVILITY: LAWYERS'
DUTIES § 6 ("We will educate clients and witnesses about proper courtroom decorum and to
the best of our ability, prevent them from creating disorder or disruption in the courtroom.").
143. MD. STATE BAR Ass'N CODE OF CIVILITY: LAWYERS' DUTIES § 3 ("We will not
encourage any person under our control to engage in conduct that would be inappropriate
under [the civility code] if we were to engage in such conduct.").
144. A LAWYER'S ASPIRATIONAL IDEALS: As TO THE COURTS & OTHER TRIBUNALS,
AND TO THOSE WHO ASSIST THEM subdiv. a(6) (Supreme Court of Ohio 1997) ("I should ...
[a]dvise clients about the obligations of civility, courtesy, fairness, cooperation and other
proper behavior expected of those who use our system of justice.").
145. CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM para. 10 (Wash. State Bar Ass'n 2001).
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H. Act with Dignity and Cooperation in Pre-Trial Proceedings
There is no aspect of litigation that prompts more allegations of incivility than
pre-trial practice, and in particular, discovery. Pre-trial is the period in which there
exists the least amount of court supervision and lawyers tend to be willing to press the
limits of zealous representation. Pre-trial is also a period in which the disclosure of
potentially damaging or costly information takes place and attempts to limit, delay, or
compel disclosure occur.' 47 These types of disputes can be contentious. Therefore, it
is no surprise that civility codes contain much guidance regarding conduct during pre-
trial proceedings.
Overall, there is an obligation to utilize pre-trial processes to accomplish the just
and efficient resolution of a dispute.148 This includes the obligations to avoid
"engag[ing] in excessive and abusive discovery" and to "comply with all reasonable
discovery requests."l49 For example, depositions should be scheduled only to obtain
needed facts or to perpetuate testimony; they should not be used as a tool to harass or
increase litigation costs. 50 The same standard of need applies to both proposing and
responding to interrogatories.' 5  Pre-trial tactics should not be utilized merely to
increase the litigation costs of the opponent.
Between counsel, there is an obligation of cooperation, truthfulness, and fair
play. Lawyers should act in a courteous and respectful manner in pre-trial
procedures.1 52 In fact, a lawyer should not do anything in a deposition or negotiation
146. See Raymond M. Ripple, Learning Outside the Fire: The Need for Civility
Instruction in Law School, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 359, 362-63 (2001).
147. See generally John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery's Fatal Flaws, 84
MINN. L. REv. 505 (2000).
148. See STATEMENT ON LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM art. I, subdiv. D(3) (Mass. Bar
Ass'n 1989) ("A lawyer should not use the discovery process to accomplish ends other than
the reasonable discovery of information necessary to a just resolution of the dispute.").
149. A LAWYER'S CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM OF THE STATE BAR OF ARIZ. subdiv.
B(6) (State Bar of Ariz. 2005) ("I will not engage in excessive and abusive discovery, and I
will comply with all reasonable discovery requests. . . .").
150. PROFESSIONALISM ASPIRATIONS art. III cmt. D(5) (Minn. State Bar Ass'n 2001)
("We will take depositions only when actually needed to ascertain facts or information or to
perpetuate testimony. We will not take depositions for the purposes of harassment or to
increase litigation expenses.").
151. Id. art. III cmt. D(7)-(8) ("We will carefully craft interrogatories so they are
limited to those matters we reasonably believe are necessary for the prosecution or defense
of an action, and we will not design them to place an undue burden or expense on a
party. ... We will respond to interrogatories reasonably and will not strain to interpret them
in an artificially restrictive manner to avoid disclosure of relevant and non-privileged
information.").
152. See A LAWYER'S CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM OF THE STATE BAR OF ARIz. subdiv.
B(8) ("In depositions and other proceedings, and in negotiations, I will conduct myself with
dignity, avoid making groundless objections and not be rude or disrespectful . . . .").
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that a lawyer would not do before a judge.' 53 Specific examples of improper conduct
in deposition include making improper objections, or instructing a witness not to
answer merely to delay or obstruct.154  Lawyers should not assert "speaking
objections" that are intended to coach a witness how to answer a question.' 55
Agreement should be sought with regard to the exchange of information, and
lawyers should seek to resolve objections by agreement.' Lawyers should not seek
court intervention in an attempt to obtain discovery that is "clearly improper."' 57
Lawyers should comply with reasonable discovery requests that are not subject to
valid objection.'58 This includes an obligation to interpret document requests and
interrogatories in a reasonable manner, and avoid overly narrow interpretations to
evade disclosure of relevant and non-privileged information.159 It also includes an
obligation to produce documents in an orderly manner, and not in any way designed
to be confusing or to make the document's discovery difficult.160
If the matter involves negotiation, lawyers should focus on matters of substance
and not issues of form or style.161 A lawyer should deliver to all counsel every
written communication she sends to the court And, if feasible, the lawyer should
send the communication at the same time and in the same manner as was sent to the
court.162
153. CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM para. 7 (Wash. State Bar Ass'n 2001) ("I will
conduct myself professionally during depositions, negotiations and any other interaction
with opposing counsel as if I were in the presence of a judge.").
154. See TEX. LAWYER'S CREED-A MANDATE FOR PROFESSIONALISM art. Ill, § 17
(Supreme Court of Tex. & Tex. Court of Criminal Appeals 1989).
155. UTAH STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM & CIVILITY No. 18 (Utah Supreme Court
2003).
156. PLEDGE OF PROFESSIONALISM art. III, § 6 (Clark Cnty., Nev. Bar Ass'n 1997) ("I
will make every effort to agree with other counsel as early as possible on the voluntary
exchange of information and a plan for discovery .... ); CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM:
LAWYER'S CREED subdiv. D (State Bar of N.M. 1989) ("I will attempt to resolve, by
agreement, my objections to matters contained in my opponent's pleadings and discovery
requests .... ).
157. TEX. LAWYER'S CREED-A MANDATE FOR PROFESSIONALISM art. III, § 18.
158. PROFESSIONALISM ASPIRATIONS art. III cmt. D(3) (Minn. State Bar Ass'n 2001)
("We will comply with all reasonable discovery requests. We will not resist discovery
requests that are not objectionable.").
159. See UTAH STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM & CIVILITY Nos. 17, 19.
160. See id. No. 19.
161. CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM: LAWYER'S CREED subdiv. C (State Bar of N.M.)
("In the preparation of documents and in negotiations, I will concentrate on substance and
content. . . .").
162. 204 PA. CODE § 99.3(14) (2011).
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I. Act as a Role Model to Client and Public and as a Mentor to Young Lawyers
Throughout civility codes there is an underlying obligation on the lawyer to
ensure that those the lawyer comes in contact with understand the definition of
civility.163 Of course, underlying this obligation is a belief by the drafters of the codes
that there is a lack of understanding by those involved in the legal process of what
civility entails.164 Minnesota and Texas both broadly state this responsibility,
providing that it is an obligation of a lawyer to "educate ... clients, the public, and
other lawyers regarding the spirit and letter" of the civility codes.' 65
A lawyer has two obligations related to educating others about civility. First, the
lawyer must model proper conduct for clients and third parties.166 In this way the
lawyer can demonstrate that the legal system should not operate as a television
drama. This obligation also seeks to instill in the client respect for the place of the
judicial system in the dispute resolution process.1 67  Lawyers likewise have the
obligation to inform clients and others under the lawyer's direction or control what
civility requires,'es and to refrain from directing others to engage in conduct that
would be uncivil if performed by a lawyer.169
163. This article later discusses in greater depth the lawyer's duty to educate others on
the rules of civility. See discussion infra Part III.G, 1. However, it is worth noting here that
this duty usually requires an attorney to "educate," "advise," or "encourage" others on
specific and discrete obligations only. See, e.g., 204 PA. CODE § 99.3(4) (providing that
attorneys "should advise clients and witnesses of the proper dress and conduct expected");
MD. STATE BAR Ass'N CODE OF CIVILITY: LAWYERS' DUTIEs § 8 (Md. State Bar Ass'n 1997)
(providing that attorneys ought to "educate ... concerning the need to be punctual and
prepared"); PLEDGE OF PROFESSIONALISM art. IV, § 1 (Clark Cnty., Nev. Bar Ass'n 1997)
(suggesting attorneys should act so as to "encourage trust of the legal profession by members
of the public. . . .").
164. See, e.g., MD. STATE BAR Ass'N CODE OF CIVILITY pmbl. (explaining that
"[c]ivility is the cornerstone of the legal profession" and implying that a code of civility is
necessary to help the legal community realize that fact).
165. PROFESSIONALISM ASPIRATIONS art. I cmt. D (Minn. State Bar Ass'n 2001); see
also TEX. LAWYER'S CREED-A MANDATE FOR PROFESSIONALISM art. 1, § 4 (Supreme Court
of Tex. & Tex. Court of Criminal Appeals 1989).
166. CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM: LAWYER'S CREED subdiv. E (State Bar of N.M.) ("I
will strive to set a high standard of professional conduct for others to follow .... ); A
LAWYER'S CREED: ASPIRATIONAL IDEALS AS A LAWYER subdiv. b (Miss. Bar Ass'n 1990)
("As a lawyer, I will aspire ... [t]o model for others, and particularly for my clients, the
respect due to those who we call upon to resolve our disputes and the regard due to all
participants in our dispute resolution processes.").
167. LAWYER'S CREED & ASPIRATIONAL STATEMENT ON PROFESSIONALISM: GEN.
ASPIRATIONAL IDEALS subdiv. b (State Bar of Ga. 1990) ("To model for others, and
particularly for my clients, the respect due to those we call upon to resolve our disputes and
the regard due to all participants in our dispute resolution processes.").
168. MD. STATE BAR Ass'N CODE OF CIVILITY: LAWYERS' DUTIES § 2 ("We will
advise our clients and witnesses to act civilly and respectfully to all participants in the legal
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Experienced lawyers also have an obligation to young lawyers who may not
know the contours of the obligation of civility that a lawyer assumes. In this regard,
more experienced lawyers must act as both a role model and a mentor to less
experienced lawyers to ensure that they are aware of their obligations of civility.170
J. Utilize the Court System in an Efficient and Fair Manner
The final concept of civility is, in a sense, an overarching catchall provision.
Lawyers should strive for orderly, economically efficient, and expeditious disposition
of litigation and transactions. '7  Efficiency is a broad obligation that underlies a
number of the civility obligations and multiple aspects of the legal process. Lawyers
should advise clients early on regarding the costs and benefits of pursuing a particular
cause of actionl 72 and should seek to articulate the disputed issues so the dispute can
be resolved in a timely manner.173 One aspect of efficiency is to pursue only those
claims or defenses that have merit. Pursuing frivolous claims or defenses costs
money and delays resolution of meritorious claims.17 In addition, lawyers should
consider whether pursuing an altemative form of dispute resolution would be a more
expeditious and economical method to resolve disputes than litigation, and should
process."); PLEDGE OF PROFESSIONALISM art. III, § 7 (Clark Cnty., Nev. Bar Ass'n) ("I will
advise my clients of the behavior expected of them before the court and other tribunals.");
TEX. LAWYER's CREED-A MANDATE FOR PROFESSIONALISM art. II, § 1 ("I will advise my
client of the contents of this Creed when undertaking representation.").
169. MD. STATE BAR Ass'N CODE OF CIVILITY: LAWYERS' DUTIES § 3 ("We will not
encourage any person under our control to engage in conduct that would be inappropriate
under these standards if we were to engage in such conduct.").
170. See PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONALISM FOR VA. LAWYERS Princ. I (Va. Bar Ass'n
2009) ("In my conduct toward everyone with whom I deal, I should . . . [a]ct as a mentor for
less experienced lawyers and as a role model for future generations of lawyers.").
171. MD. STATE BAR Ass'N CODE OF CIVILITY: LAWYERS' DUTIES § 5 ("We will strive
for orderly, efficient, ethical and fair disposition of litigation, as well as disputed matters that
are not yet the subject of litigation, and for the efficient, ethical, and fair negotiation and
consummation of business transactions.").
172. STATEMENT OF PROFESSIONALISM para. 8 (Or. State Bar 2006) ("I will always
advise my clients of the costs and potential benefits or risks of any considered legal position
or course of action.").
173. STATEMENT ON LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM art. II, subdiv. A(d) (Mass. Bar Ass'n
1989) (providing that an attorney should "present issues efficiently without unnecessarily
burdening opposing counsel by discovery or otherwise"); HALLMARKS OF PROFESSIONALISM
No. 7 (Kan. Bar Ass'n 1987) (suggesting that an ethical professional "[e]xpedites the
resolution of disputes through research, articulation of claims, and clarifying the issues").
174. PLEDGE OF PROFESSIONALISM art. I, § 1 (Clark Cnty., Nev. Bar Ass'n 1997) ("I
will achieve my client's lawful objectives as expeditiously and economically as possible, and
I will advise my client against pursuing any matter that is without merit .... ).
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advise clients accordingly.175  Similarly, lawyers should always be open to the
possibility of settlement of disputes so they can be resolved as soon as possible. 176
IV. CIVILY AS DISTINct FROM LEGAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONALISM
The identification of the core concepts of civility is the first step to identifying
civility as a unique professional responsibility obligation. The next task is to show
how civility interacts with, and is distinguished from, other established obligations of
professional responsibility-specifically, legal ethics and professionalism. This part
seeks to identify these similarities and differences.
As an initial matter, it is impossible to study a lawyer's professional obligations
as a monolithic and consistent topic. For example, the meaning of the phrase "legal
ethics" has shifted over time; a lawyer from the year 1900 would hardly recognize
how the modem lawyer uses the term.' 77 To understand how "civility" relates to
these established professional responsibilities, it is important to understand the
development and interaction of these obligations. This is particularly true with regard
to legal ethics, the most evolved professional responsibility.
To understand how legal ethics differs from what we consider civility today, it is
important to explore the meaning of the term "legal ethics" as developed over time.
The development does not follow a neat linear path. Instead, certain significant
events can be seen as markers that changed the definition of legal ethics. These
events roughly coincide with codification of lawyer regulations by the ABA. Thus,
the change in the conception of legal ethics can be roughly traced as follows: (a) the
personal ethos era (pre-1908); (b) the Canons ofEthics era (1908-1970); and (c) the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility and Model Rules of Pmfessional Conduct
era (1970-present).
A. Personal Ethos Era (Pre-1908)
The personal ethos era, which existed prior to 1908, was marked by two defining
characteristics. First, there was a decentralized regulation of the legal profession.
175. CAL. ATT'Y GUIDELINES OF CIVILITY & PROFESSIONALISM § 13(a) (State Bar of
Cal. 2007) ("An attorney should advise a client at the outset of the relationship of the
availability of informal or alternative dispute resolution."); STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM
§ 2.10 (Okla. Bar Ass'n 2006) ("We will consider whether the client's interests can be
adequately served and the controversy more expeditiously and economically resolved by
arbitration, mediation or some other form of alternative dispute resolution, or by expedited
trial; and we will raise the issue of settlement and alternative dispute resolution as soon as a
case can be evaluated and meaningful compromise negotiations can be undertaken.").
176. See STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM § 2.10 (Okla. Bar Ass'n).
177. See Benjamin H. Barton, The ABA, The Rules, and Professionalism: The
Mechanics of Self-Defeat and a Call for a Return to the Ethical, Moral, and Practical
Approach ofthe Canons, 83 N.C. L. REv. 411, 426 (2005).
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Prior to the adoption of the ABA Canons ofEthics in 1908, most states did not have
codified ethical rules or guidelines. During this time, "ethical norms developed
largely through professional traditions and informal community oversight." 79
Deviant lawyers were constrained by the norms of the profession,1so and were
disciplined by voluntary bar associations and ad-hoc evaluations by judges as a
matter of inherent power.' 8' Second, lawyer ethics during this era was viewed
through the prism of morality:
178. At the time the ABA adopted the Canons of Ethics in 1908, only eleven states
had enacted some form of ethical guidelines: Alabama (1887); Georgia (1889); Virginia
(1889); Michigan (1897); Colorado (1898); North Carolina (1900); Wisconsin (1901); West
Virginia (1902); Maryland (1902); Kentucky (1903); and Missouri (1906). George P.
Costigan, Jr., Dean, Univ. of Neb. Coll. of Law, The Canons of Legal Ethics, Address
Before the Lancaster County, Nebraska Bar Association (Mar. 27, 1909), in 21 GREEN BAG
271, 274 (1909).
179. DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 43 (2d ed. 1998); see also
Barton, supra note 177 ("In the earliest days of American lawyers there was little
consideration of 'legal ethics' as a distinct entity. The ethical and moral obligations of
lawyers derived largely from religious principles, and lawyer conduct was regulated through
the natural peer pressure of a small, homogeneous group or through the common law
'summary jurisdiction' each court retained over the lawyers who practiced before them."
(footnotes omitted)).
180. Edwin Baker Gager, Judge, Conn. Superior Court, Professor, Yale Law Sch., The
Duties of Attorney, Address Before Connecticut Bar Applicants (June 20, 1911), in 21 YALE
L.J. 72, 74-75 (1911) ("What I want you to note here for a moment is that these rules of
common honesty grouped together under the term 'legal ethics' are not by authority imposed
upon lawyers from without, but they are drawn from observation of the actual conduct and
practice of the honorable, high minded members of the profession. They are, so to speak, the
customary law of lawyers in their professional relations, and their binding force lies in the
fact that for hundreds of years they have in practice been recognized as vital to the
usefulness and the continued existence, even, of the legal profession."); see also Book Note,
20 YALE L.J. 336, 336 (1911) (reviewing GLEASON L. ARCHER, ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS OF
THE LAWYER (1910)) ("A lawyer should depend, not only on his personal notion of right and
wrong, but also on the long established customs and traditions of the profession.").
181. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 5 intro. note (1998)
("From colonial times until late in the 19th century, lawyer discipline was almost entirely a
function of courts and voluntary bar associations. A lawyer would be proceeded against in a
show-cause proceeding before a court, at the suit either of an injured client, an adversary
lawyer, or a voluntary bar association."); see also Ex parte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9,
13 (1857) ("[I]t has been well settled, by the rules and practice of common-law courts, that it
rests exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified to become one of its officers,
as an attorney and counsellor, and for what cause he ought to be removed. The power,
however, is not an arbitrary and despotic one, to be exercised at the pleasure of the court, or
from passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; but it is the duty of the court to exercise and
regulate it by a sound and just judicial discretion, whereby the rights and independence of
the bar may be as scrupulously guarded and maintained by the court, as the rights and
dignity of the court itself."); Orrin N. Carter, Ethics of the Legal Profession (pt. 3), 9 ILL. L.
REV. 453, 463 (1915) ("The advantage of some method of disciplining lawyers who do not
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[L]et me remind you that legal ethics is not strictly a special kind of ethics or
morals, but it consists in the application of those general moral rules which
should govern the conduct of us all, to those special relations arising from the
nature of the lawyer's business. If, in the broad sense, a man is sound morally,
his legal ethics will cause him little difficulty.18 2
In sum, during this era legal ethics were viewed largely as a matter of personal
and professional morality learned through a proper upbringing and enforced through
a desire to remain in good standing with the legal guild. Legal ethics was defined as
the personal ethos (or character) of the lawyer, and this character guided the lawyer's
decisions in a particular case. In fact, there was a belief that what was morally
wrong could not be ethically or professionally right. 18 4 This philosophy held so long
as the legal profession was a closed society and lawyers operated as solo practitioners
or in small firms and communities. The changing nature of the legal profession and
of law practice in the early twentieth century, however, resulted in a movement to
codify ethical standards.
comply with the ethics of the profession has always been appreciated. The right to discipline
attorneys by suspension or disbarment, as well as by contempt proceedings, has been
exercised from the earliest times by the courts. Because attorneys are officers of the court,
this power has always been exercised, in the absence of constitutional or statutory
restrictions, by all courts of general or superior jurisdiction.").
182. Gager, supra note 180, at 75.
183. See id. at 77.
184. See id. at 75.
185. Costigan, supra note 178, at 271. In 1909, the Dean of the University of
Nebraska College of Law noted an emerging need for new ethical standards:
The changing conditions of professional practice, tending in the direction of
commercializing a large part of the bar of the country, both in and out of our
cities, and in particular the weakening of an effective professional public opinion
due chiefly to the growth of large cities with their infinite possibilities of
concealed wrongdoing, have combined, in the opinion of reflective lawyers, to
create a situation calling for something more definite in the way of rules of
professional ethics than we have had in the past.
Id. The ABA itself noted four reasons for adopting the 1908 Canons:
[(1)] We know [the republic] cannot be so maintained unless the conduct and
motives of the members of our profession ... are what they ought to be. It
therefore becomes our plain and simple duty, our patriotic duty, to use our
influence in every legitimate way to help make the American bar what it ought to
be. A code of ethics, adopted after due deliberation, . . . is one method in
furtherance of this end.
. . . [(2)] We cannot be blind to the fact that, however high may be the motives of
some, the trend of many is away from the ideals of the past, and the tendency
more and more to reduce our high calling to the level of a trade, to a mere means
of livelihood, or of personal aggrandizement. . .. Never having realized or
grasped that indefinable ethical something which is the soul and spirit of law and
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This changing mindset toward professional responsibility and ethics coincided
with a larger philosophical mood of the time. During the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, there was a movement in the fields of law, politics, and
government-promoted by the progress of the natural sciences through the scientific
method--to develop uniform laws or rules that could provide, with scientific
certainty, what was and was not appropriate behavior.186 This philosophical
movement, combined with changes in the profession itself, led to a belief that the
proper ethos could be distilled into a certain number of rules or laws.187 This concept
of justice, they not only lower the morale within the profession, but they debase
our high calling in the eyes of the public.
... [(3) The standards of] "[g]ood behavior" [for lawyers] should be defined and
measured by such ethical standards, however high, as are necessary to keep the
administration of justice pure and unsullied .... [T]he adoption and promulgation
of a series of reasonable canons of professional ethics, in the form of a code by
the American Bar Association, cannot but have a salutary effect upon the
administration of justice, and upon the conduct of lawyers generally, whether on
the bench or at the bar.
... [(4) M]any men depart from honorable and accepted standards of practice
early in their careers as the result of actual ignorance of the ethical requirements
of the situation.
Henry St. George Tucker et al., Report of the Committee on Code of Professional Ethics, 29
ANN. REP. A.B.A. 600, 600-03 (1906).
186. See George Trumbull Ladd, Professor, Yale Univ., Ethics and the Law, Lecture
Before the Yale Law Sch. (Mar. 10, 1909), in 18 YALE L.J. 613, 614 (1909). In his 1909
discussion on ethics, Professor Ladd noted:
Ethics is the science of human conduct-its sources, its development, its
sanctions, and its most general principles-as related to a rational ideal. Or, to
define more strictly this science . . . by ethics we mean the collective sentiments,
judgments, and approved practices of the body of the people, with respect to what
is deemed right and wrong in conduct, as measured by a certain ideal standard of
character-in a word, the public conscience or moral consciousness.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). For more information regarding this movement, see
JOHN G. GUNNELL, THE DESCENT OF POLITICAL THEORY: THE GENEALOGY OF AN AMERICAN
VOCATION (1993). This infatuation with the scientific method operated in professions
throughout the society at the time. See MICHAEL SCHUDSON, DISCOVERING THE NEWS: A
SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS 5-6 (1978). Professor Schudson defines the
difference between fact and value in journalism this way:
Facts . .. are assertions about the world open to independent validation. They
stand beyond the distorting influences of any individual's personal preferences.
Values ... . are an individual's conscious or unconscious preferences for what the
world should be; they are seen as ultimately subjective and so without legitimate
claim on other people.
Id. Journalists responded to the divide between facts and values by adopting "objectivity" as
their standard. See id. at 6-7.
187. See Ladd, supra note 186; Colin Croft, Note, Reconceptualizing American Legal




provided the groundwork for the ABA's 1908 codification of the Canons of Ethics
("Canons").
B. The 1908 Canons ofEthics Era
In 1908, after two years of study, the ABA adopted the Canons ofEthics. 8 The
Canons, as adopted, contained thirty-two provisions which were intended to be a
codification of the "unwritten law," and to set out "statements of principles and rules
accepted and acknowledged by reputable attomeys ... 8."19 Justification for adopting
the Canons in a codified form was to inform the new (and ever more diverse)
members of the bar, who were viewed as not having the same moral compass as prior
generations, of their ethical obligations. 190 In this sense, the Canons were adopted
primarily as a primer on morality, and not as a set of disciplinary rules.191 In fact, in
An Essay on Professional Ethics, a seminal work on which the Canons were based,
Chief Justice George Sharswood of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that
"[t]here is, perhaps, no profession, after that of the sacred ministry, in which a high-
toned morality is more imperatively necessary than that of the law."l 92 Thus, Chief
Justice Sharswood recognized early on the need "to arrive at some accurate and
intelligible rules by which to guide and govern the conduct of professional life." 93
Following this notion, the 1908 Canons were perceived as setting out "common
188. Walter Burgwyn Jones, Canons of Professional Ethics, Their Genesis and
History, 7 NOTRE DAME LAW. 483,496 (1932).
189. Hepp v. Petrie, 200 N.W. 857, 859 (Wis. 1924).
190. See Comment, Declaration Concerning Professional Ethics Recently Adopted by
the State Bar Association of Connecticut, 19 YALE L.J. 571, 571-72 (1910) ("If all men were
endowed with [sound wisdom and high moral character] at the beginning of their
professional lives, such codes would be of little value, save to indicate to the outside world
what standards prevail within the profession, and thereby enhance the confidence in and
respect for those who conform to those requirements, and are in good standing in their
respective professions. . . . Unfortunately, however, this is not the case, and many young
men come to the Bar lacking the benefits of sound home, social and religious training.
Sometimes-though rarely-in such men we find a strong innate sense of right, and of
consideration for others, with whom all that may be found in a code of ethics would be
intuitive."); Robert Sprague Hall, The Ethics of the Law, LAW STUDENT's HELPER, Apr.
1913, at 10, 10 ("[T]his condition of affairs, I mean the popular estimate of the moral
standard of lawyers, has been the chief incentive to the drawing up of codes of ethics like the
Canons, by men who look upon the profession of the law as something better than a trade,
and whose pride has felt the sting of the widely-current distrust of the legal practitioner.").
The Canons were also seen as a benefit, even for lawyers of "highest training," because they
reminded attorneys of the rules and the need to measure professional conduct against them.
See Comment, supra, at 572.
191. See Comment, supra note 190.
192. SHARSWOOD, supra note 20, at 55.
193. Id. at 56.
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sense and common ideas of right and wrong," thereby providing the essence of what
it meant to be an ethical lawyer.' 94
Because of their status as statements of moral guidance, the 1908 Canons were
general and broad. The tenor was explicitly aspirational, with more emphasis on
guidance than the specificity needed for enforcement. Over time, however, bar
associations and courts began to rely on the provisions of the Canons to impose
discipline on attorneys.'95 As the Canons developed into enforceable obligations,
lawyers expressed concern that the Canons were too general and vague to both guide
lawyers in appropriate conduct and inform courts and disciplinary authorities on what
could be enforced as unethical.196 In addition, scholars, jurists, and lawyers began to
question whether the rules regulating lawyer conduct should be statements of
morality or more specific statements regulating the practice of law.197 In 1930 it was
observed: "It is submitted that there is much in the canons of professional ethics that
can be called 'ethics' only at the expense of confusing ethics and morality on the one
hand with approved standards of professional decorum on the other."198
194. Hall, supra note 190, at 13.
195. Barton, supra note 177, at 431-34.
196. See id. at 434-35 n.89; Edward L. Wright, Study of the Canons of Professional
Ethics, 11 CATH. LAW. 323, 323 (1965) ("[T]he canons of Professional Ethics of the
American Bar Association need revision in four principal particulars: (1) there are important
areas involving the conduct of lawyers which are either partially covered or totally omitted;
(2) many Canons which are sound in substance have been awkwardly or deficiently stated;
(3) practical sanctions for violations are virtually non-existent; and (4) changing conditions
in an urbanized society require new statements of professional responsibility."); Harlan F.
Stone, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, The Public Influence of the Bar, Address at the
Dedication of the University of Michigan Law Quadrangle (June 15, 1934), in 48 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 10 (1934) (stating that revisions to the 1908 Canons "must pass beyond the petty
details of form and manners which have been so largely the subject of our codes of ethics, to
more fundamental consideration of the way in which our professional activities affect the
welfare of society as a whole"); see also RHODE, supra note 179, at 44; Philbrick McCoy,
The Canons ofEthics: A Reappraisal by the Organized Bar, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1957, at 38, 38.
197. See, e.g., Will Shafroth, The Forty-Five Commandments of a Lawyer, A.B.A. J.,
June 1932, at 412, 413 ("[T]he subject of legal ethics divides itself into two distinct
categories. It consists first of a body of moral principles, such as those which forbid a
lawyer ... to act in any way in which an honorable man would not act. On the other hand,
there are a number of principles which deal with what may be termed the etiquette of the
profession, and which are not concerned with morality .... "); Olin E. Watts, Chairman,
Nat'l Conference of Bar Exam'rs, Advancement of Professional Ideals in Law Students,
Address Before the National Conference of Bar Examiners and the American Bar
Association Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar (Aug. 25, 1955), in 33 U.
DET. MERCY L. REV. 314, 317 (1956) ("Too often legal ethics connotes the subject matter
contained in the canons of professional ethics. An understanding of these rules does not
insure ethical conduct.").
198. Charles H. Kinnane, Compulsory Study of Professional Ethics by Law Students,
A.B.A. J., Jan. 1930, at 222, 223.
1332011/12]
GONZAGA LAW REVIEW
The assaults on the base of the Canons were an attack on their morality and
ethos-based emphasis. The Canons were characterized as "generalizations designed
for an earlier era" that focused disciplinary action on the "inconsequential."' 99 The
feeling was that, with changes in the nature of society and the legal profession, the
Canons should be reevaluated. 200 The shift from rural to more urban practices as the
country industrialized called for rules that specifically addressed issues faced by
urban lawyers.201 In addition, practice was evolving beyond the sole practitioner
primarily involved in litigation. Development of new areas of law (such as taxation,
transportation law, regulation of business, security transactions, workers'
compensation, administrative law, and labor law) led away from the general, sole
practitioner to lawyers who practiced in firms or who were employed by government
agencies.202 Another development was the rise of pre-trial discovery techniques, as
well as various specialty courts and the use of arbitration and mediation. 203 With
these developments, a code of ethics focusing on the "individual courtroom
advocate" was viewed as inadequate and outdated.204
In sum, changes in society and the way law was practiced led to the need to
reevaluate the 1908 Canons and this debate had a significant impact on how "legal
ethics" was perceived by members of the bar. While the 1908 Canons were
presented as fundamental and unchanging core tenets of legal ethics, by the mid-
1960s the view was that the rules of ethics should reflect the more practical realities
205of the legal profession. One author noted in 1965 that ethical obligations changed
199. Wright, supra note 196, at 324; see also Harry Cohen, Ambivalence Affecting
Modern American Law Practice, 18 ALA. L. REv. 31, 31 (1965) ("Many rules and principles
which purport to guide professional conduct today are based on the premise that the
American lawyer is in the same economic and professional environment as his predecessors
who practiced in the nineteenth century or as barristers in the English system.").
200. Donald T. Weckstein, A Re-Evaluation of the Canons of Professional Ethics -
Evaluated, 33 TENN. L. REV. 176, 180 (1966) (listing numerous changes in contemporary
society and law practice that justified reevaluating the Canons at that time).
201. See Cohen, supra note 199, at 35; McCoy, supra note 196, at 39.
202. Cohen, supra note 199, at 35 ("In marked contrast to the prior century's typical
one or two man office, lawyers began organizing large law firms in which teams of
specialists could take a comprehensive view of clients' problems. This produced a new type
of lawyer who was an expert in planning, manipulation, and negotiation to achieve desired
ends while advocating legal conflict, and who was more interested in results than in
litigation." (footnotes omitted)); McCoy, supra note 196, at 39.
203. See Edwin W. Tucker, Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia: A Call to
Realism in Legal Ethics, 14 EMORY J. PUB. L. 3, 18 (1965) ("While the pre-trial procedure
has found a great deal of support as a tool in clearing congested trial calendars, one cannot
help but recognize the fact that, in effect, there has to some extent been an admission that the
long established rules underlying the legal process in some respects have proved to be less
than satisfactory under the present environmental conditions."); McCoy, supra note 196, at
39.
204. McCoy, supra note 196, at 40.
205. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239,
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over time: "What may be viewed as ethically improper at one time may be
considered appropriate at another."20 6 This mindset was a significant break from the
personal ethos era of legal ethics.
C. The Code ofProfessional Responsibility and the Rules of
Professional Conduct Era
With rising discontent over the 1908 Canons, members of the bar (voiced
through state bar associations and the ABA) faced the following question: if the
morality-driven Canons were insufficient, what should replace them? The solution,
adopted in the 1969 Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code"), was to combine
the rules of morality and rules of ethics:
A code of professional responsibility for lawyers should serve a two-fold
purpose. First, the code (or Canons) should be fully stated to aid the lawyer in
his search for appreciation and understanding of the ethics, high principles and
dedicated aspirations of the legal profession. In this sense it is truly a moral
code, addressed primarily to the lawyer's conscience. Secondly, it should be a
statement of the commonly accepted minimum standards of professional
responsibility, in which sense it is a binding legal code enforceable by
disciplinary action of the courts.207
This dual response was achieved by dividing the Code into three parts: Canons,
Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules. The Canons constituted broad
"statements of axiomatic norms."208 The morality-based Ethical Considerations were
"aspirational in character and represent[ed] the objectives toward which every
member of the profession should strive."20 9 In contrast, "[t]he Disciplinary Rules
state[d] the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being
subject to disciplinary action."210
The Code's attempt to serve a dual role of providing moral and ethical guidance
was criticized almost immediately. One author described the Code as the adolescent
stage in the development of rules of professional responsibility with the next stage
being a bright-line set of obligations and prohibitions.211 The Code was not only
1257-60 (1991).
206. Tucker, supra note 203, at 19.
207. Wright, supra note 196, at 325; see also Barton, supra note 177, at 436-37
("[T]he Code is the ABA's first explicit division between 'professionalism' and minimum
Rules: the Disciplinary Rules govern lawyer conduct, and the Canons and the Ethical
Considerations are relegated to food for thought.").
208. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY preliminary statement (1969).
209. Id
210. Id.
211. L. Ray Patterson, Wanted: A New Code of Professional Responsibility, A.B.A. J.,
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criticized for its structure and emphasis, but also faulted for numerous
"discrepancies" that were discovered: discrepancies within the Code, between the
Code and substantive law, and between what the Code provided and what lawyers
21and the public expected.212 In addition, courts were becoming involved with issues
of attorney regulation such as "minimum fees, advertising, solicitation, group legal
services, and pre-trial publicity." 13 These cases further emphasized the need to make
clear the ethical ramifications of these rulings.
In response, a committee was established to propose revisions to the Code in
1977 (less than a decade after the Code's adoption), and the ABA approved a
significantly revised and reorganized Code in 1983.21 The new standards, titled the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, adopted the structure of the American Law
Institute's Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers.2 15 The new ABA
rules abandoned the "Ethical Considerations" and "Disciplinary Rules," and instead
216opted for black-letter rules with accompanying comments. Today, almost all states
have adopted a version of the 1983 standards.21 Adoption of the Model Rules of
Professional Responsibility and the omission of statements of morality marked a final
break between the concepts of legal ethics and morality.218
As legal ethics moved from moral guidelines to disciplinable rules, the phrase
"legal ethics" lost its moral context and became a question of compliance with
May 1977, at 639, 639 ("[The Code is] a transitional document, representing a middle stage
in the development of law for lawyers. The hortatory tone of the canons, the undue concern
for protecting the profession in many of the ethical considerations, and the self-serving
nature of many of the disciplinary rules are points to criticize, but they should not obscure
the fact that the code is a major step forward.").
212. Robert J. Kutak, Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Ethical Standards for the
'80s andBeyond, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1981, at 1116, 1116.
213. Id.; see also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (upholding a
blanket restriction on in-person solicitation); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977)
(invalidating a blanket ban on lawyer advertising); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773
(1975) (striking down minimum fee schedules); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Ill. State
Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967) (striking down a restriction on group legal services);
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (addressing issues of pretrial publicity).
214. See Am. BAR Ass'N, ABAANNUAL REPORT 1982-1983, at 13 (1983), in A.B.A. J.,
Jan. 1984, at 79.
215 Kutak, supra note 212, at 1117 (recommending the adoption of the Restatement
format, calling it more "familiar and convenient").
216. Id.; see also AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 214, at 13 ("The Model Code of
Professional Responsibility had been passed in 1969, but quickly became outdated as the
practice of law changed dramatically during the 1970s.").
211. Ctr. for Prof I Responsibility, Alphabetical List of States Adopting Model Rules,
A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional-responsibility/publications/model_
rules of professional conduct/alpha liststate adoptingmodel rules.html (last visited Oct.
10, 2011). As of October 2011, California is the only state that has not adopted a version of
the Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct. Id.
218. Barton, supra note 177, at 440-41.
136 [Vol. 47:1
CIVILITY IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW
minimal regulatory standards. 2 19 Today when lawyers speak of "ethical" conduct, the
most likely connotation is the minimal behavior required to avoid sanction-not
whether the conduct is morally right or wrong. This is a far cry from the 1908
Canons ofEthics.
In sum, the evolution from a consideration of ethos to the current reliance on
minimum guidelines to avoid discipline has given the term "legal ethics" a uniquely
narrow meaning, largely stripped of its moral context.220 The rules set out in
disciplinary codes today are "mainly concerned with lawyer functions performed by a
lawyer in the course of representing a client and causing harm to the client, to a legal
institution such as a court, or to a third person."221 While these rules set out a
lawyer's obligations to the court, client, or third person, it is now left to the individual
lawyer to consider the morality of her actions-apart from ethical considerations. 222
D. Defining Pmfessionalism
The focus until now has been to set out the development of the current
understanding of legal ethics.223 There remains another commonly cited obligation
of lawyers-professionalism. Do lawyers have unique professional obligations that
are different from those required as a matter of ethics? It is difficult to pin down a
definition of "professional" and "professionalism" because the terms are used
interchangeably to refer to a number of different concepts.224 For example, the
219. Id. ("[I]n legal parlance 'legal ethics' has become synonymous with the minimum
rules governing attorney conduct. In light of the explicitly moral use of 'ethics' in common
parlance, the application of the phrase 'legal ethics' to minimum rules carries substantial
interpretive freight. The phrase 'legal ethics' imbues the Rules with a depth and a meaning
they no longer have." (footnotes omitted)).
220. See Allen K. Harris, The Professionalism Crisis-the '7' Words and Other
Rambo Tactics: The Conference of Chief Justices'Solution, 53 S.C. L. REV. 549, 567 (2002).
221. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 5 cmt. b (1998).
222. Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3, 15-16 (1951)
("[T]here is nothing unethical in taking a bad case or defending the guilty or advocating
what you don't believe in.... We are not dealing with the morals which govern a man
acting for himself, but with the ethics of advocacy. We are talking about the special moral
code which governs a man who is acting for another. Lawyers in their practice-how they
behave elsewhere does not concern us-put off more and more of our common morals the
farther they go in a profession which treats right and wrong, vice and virtue, on such equal
terms.").
223. In highlighting the distinction between ethics and morals, this article makes no
normative claims about the division but merely emphasizes how that distinction impacts
professional responsibility as a whole. Professor Barton, by contrast, identifies normative
problems and solutions relating to the current rules' division of "minimalist" obligations on
the one hand and "broadly ethical" (what I have called "moral") obligations on the other
hand. See generally Barton, supra note 177.
224. Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1303, 1307 (1995) ("No term in the legal lexicon has been more abused than
2011/12] 137
GONZAGA LAW REVIEW
practice of law is a profession-an "organized group pursuing a learned art in the
public service." 225 Therefore, professionalism can refer generally to the nature of the
profession. Professionalism can also refer to conduct-a lawyer who is rude or
uncivil may be said to be acting "unprofessionally." 226 Professionalism is also used
to indicate a violation of a lawyer's ethical obligations-a lawyer who is disciplined
is likewise said to have acted "unprofessionally."2 2 7 In fact, the most current version
of the ABA's model rules includes the term "professional" in its title.2 28  These
varying views of professionalism are not inherently incorrect-the concept certainly
can encompass all of these concerns.229 The risk, however, is that by taking on too
many meanings, "professionalism" becomes a generic phrase with no deeper
substantive meaning that fits any occasion.
The goal here is to present a narrow definition of "professionalism." First, what
professionalism is not: it is not the same thing as legal ethics. Professor Roger
'professionalism."').
225. Robert F. Drinan, The Responsibility of the Lawyer to His Profession, 42 J. AM.
JUDICATURE SOC'Y 192, 192 (1959) (internal quotation marks omitted); Luther W.
Youngdahl, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the D.C., The Lawyer's Responsibilities, Address at
the University of Missouri School of Law Annual Banquet, in 20 Mo. L. REV. 307, 311
(1955) ("Rightly conceived, . . . [the legal) profession is a branch of the public service rather
than an ordinary business vocation.... The prime object of the profession should be the
service it can render to humanity-reward of financial gain should be a subordinate
consideration, and the lawyer with the proper conception of the profession need have no fear
of financial reward.").
226. Joseph J. Ortego & Lindsay Maleson, Incivility: An Insult to the Professional and
the Profession, BRIEF, Spring 2008, at 53, 54 ("While both professional and unprofessional
behavior can readily be identified when witnessed, various authors have attempted to define
professionalism, which is also known as civility."); see also Barton, supra note 177, at 445
n. 127 (discussing various uses of the term "professionalism"). See generally Orrin K. Ames
111, Concerns About the Lack of Professionalism: Root Causes Rather than Symptoms Must
Be Addressed, 28 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 531 (2005) (examining the root causes of
unprofessional conduct).
227. Barton, supra note 177, at 441 ("In a further unlikely turn of nomenclature,
professionalism has come to embody what a lawyer 'should' do, i.e., professionalism has
come to cover a lawyer's ethical duties. The dictionary and common parlance meaning of
professionalism, however, is devoid of any moral significance; it simply embodies the
'qualities or features, as competence, skill, etc., characteristic of a profession or a
professional."' (footnote omitted) (quoting 2 THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES 2368 (Lesley Brown ed., 1993))).
228. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2009).
229. COuM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM, AM. BAR Ass'N, .... IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC
SERVICE: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 10 (1986)
("'Professionalism' is an elastic concept the meaning and application of which are hard to
pin down. That is perhaps as it should be. The term has a rich, long-standing heritage, and
any single definition runs the risk of being too confining."); Neil Hamilton & Verna
Monson, The Positive Empirical Relationship of Professionalism to Effectiveness in the
Practice ofLaw, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 137, 139 (2011).
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Cramton puts it this way: "[T]he contemporary evolution of ethical codes into quasi-
criminal rules of minimum conduct largely abandons their role as a source of
vocation or calling. The morality of aspiration, central to professionalism, is eclipsed
by the morality of duty."230 To put it another way, ethical obligations can be seen as
the shall-nots of lawyering, and professionalism as creating affirmative obligations of
the lawyer to the broader society.
What professionalism does encompass is "the full measure of the profession's
aspiration and of society's legitimate expectations.'2 3  The professional obligations
of lawyers are those responsibilities assumed, not on behalf of the client or even the
court, but rather on behalf of society as a whole. Attorney and scholar Walter E.
Craig states: "Today, as never before, . . . [it is] incumbent upon the members of the
legal profession to assert leadership in the struggle to maintain the philosophy of
freedom under law, respect for law and property rights, and respect for the inalienable
rights of the individual citizens."' 32 Thus, it is the obligation of the lawyer to society,
and more specifically, the fundamental tenets of democratic society, that set
professionalism apart from morality or ethics. 23 3
Adoption of the current rules of ethical conduct placed a particular strain on
consideration of the ideals of professionalism. With specific ethical obligations in
place, law schools began offering professional responsibility courses in which the
primary focus was on the ethical rules themselves-neglecting discussions of
lawyers' obligations to overarching societal interests.234 In questioning the neglect of
the teaching of professional responsibility beyond the Canons, one author
commented as follows:
230. Roger C. Cramton, Teaching and Learning Professionalism, in TEACHING AND
LEARNING PROFESSIONALIsM 7, 10 (1996).
231. Walter E. Craig, Ethical Responsibilities of the Individual Lawyer, 17 ARK. L.
REV. 288, 289-90 (1963) (internal quotation marks omitted).
232. Id. at 291; see also Drinan, supra note 225, at 194 ("Lawyers by their very nature
are dedicated to the public interest. Lawyers are the servants of the ministry ofjustice.").
233. See Youngdahl, supra note 225, at 313 (calling for the "rebirth of the
professional spirit" and describing the lawyer's duty of professionalism as the duty "to see
that the foundations of free government are not shaken; that sound thinking and action
prevail; that the citizens are aroused to constant dangers that lurk at every turn and to the
necessity of eternal vigilance"); see also Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional
Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1958, at 1159, 1159 ("The
legal profession has its traditional standards of conduct, its codified Canons of Ethics. The
lawyer must know and respect these rules established for the conduct of his professional life.
At the same time he must realize that a letter-bound observance of the Canons is not
equivalent to the practice of professional responsibility."); cf Ross L. Malone, The Lawyer
and His Professional Responsibilities, 17 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 191, 191 (1960).
234. Maksymilian Del Mar, Beyond Text in Legal Education: Art, Ethics, and the
Carnegie Report, 56 LoY. L. REV. 955, 976-77 (2010) (noting that law school ethics courses
focus on the technical aspects of law practice without addressing its moral aspects).
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Inculcation of professional standards is far more than a study of the rules laid
down in the canons of professional ethics and a few court decisions involving
disciplinary proceedings. It must be an attempt to develop professional
character. While the term 'legal ethics' is used frequently by leaders seeking an
improvement in the instilling of professional attitudes and ideals, the objective
sought is an 'intelligent and whole-hearted attempt to develop Professional
Character.' 235
In 1986, the ABA issued a report defining professionals as those "pursuing a
learned art ... in the spirit of public service ... ." 236 The emphasis on public service
or the social responsibility of the lawyer is at the heart of the definition of
professionalism.23 7 A lawyer's "social conscience" is defined as
a sympathetic understanding of one's age, openness of mind, courage,
independence, hatred of oppression, and an abiding determination to do one's
bit, as opportunity offers, toward making the world a more decent habitation for
the human spirit, and the administration of justice a fitter and more perfect
instrument for the consummation of that greater end.238
To demonstrate the relationship between the practice of law and
professionalism, the right to practice in the legal profession entails an agreement
235. Watts, supra note 198, at 318 (quoting Bernard C. Gavit, Legal Ethics and the
Law Schools, A.B.A. J., May 1932, at 326, 326). In this same article, Watts quotes Justice
Harlan Stone as saying:
[T]here is grave danger to the public if this proficiency [in obtaining qualified law
students] be directed wholly to private ends without thought of social
consequences, and we may well pause to consider whether the professional school
has done well to neglect so completely the inculcation of some knowledge of the
social responsibility which rests upon a public profession. I do not refer to the
teaching of professional ethics.
Id. at 314 (quoting Stone, supra note 196, at 13-14). Watts also relates the experiences of a
legal ethics professor who "felt that instead of conveying to the student some idea of the
dignity of the legal profession he was simply laying down ground rules which, if the student
followed, would enable him to avoid trouble." Id. at 318.
236. COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 229 (quoting ROSCOE POUND, THE
LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 5 (1953)).
237. Jack R. Frymier, Professionalism in Context, 26 OHIO ST. L.J. 53, 53 (1965)
("Four distinguishing characteristics are evident for those persons and groups recognized as
truly professional: professionals perform an essential service for their fellow man; they
make special judgments which affect these other beings; they have a code of ethics; and they
exercise control of their professional peers to achieve the service ends toward which they
aspire.").
238. Lloyd K. Garrison, Dean, Univ. of Wis. Law Sch., Character Training of Law
Students from the Point of View of the Law Schools and the Bar, Address Before the
American Bar Association Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, in 8 AM.
L. SCH. REV. 592, 596-97 (1936).
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between the lawyer and society where, in return for obtaining a license to practice
law, lawyers agree to ensure that their actions serve the public good (even if those
interests conflict with those of an individual client).239 Ill short, professionalism is
defined not as what a lawyer must do (obey ethics rules while acting zealously on
behalf of a client), but by what a lawyer should do to protect the integrity of the legal
system.240
The focus of professionalism is different not only from ethics, but also morality.
While morality focuses on a lawyer's obligation to bring his personal beliefs of right
and wrong to bear in his practice, professionalism is concerned with broader concerns
of how the lawyer's actions will impact the profession itself As one commentator
put it, "[t]o us it makes no difference that John Doe is bound for Hell, if his sins en
route do not besmirch the fair name of our calling."241 While hyperbolic, this quote
makes the fundamental distinction between morality and professionalism clear:
morality represents a personal conscience, whereas professionalism represents a
social conscience.
E. Viewing Civility in the Light ofLegal Ethics and Professionalism
Prior studies have found it difficult to define the parameters of civility.24 2 I
attempting a definition, one author went so far as to suggest that the best that can be
said about uncivil behavior is, like Justice Stewart's assessment of pornography,2 43
that "you know it when you see it.'2 44 With the continuing press for more civility by
the bench and bar,245 however, nebulous definitions are not useful. The adoption of
239. Neil Hamilton, Professionalism Clearly Defined, 18 PROF. LAW., no. 4, 2008 at
4, 4-5.
240. The Practice of Law-Is There Anything More to It than Making Money?, 1988
PROc. FIRsT ANN. GA. CONVOCATION ON PROFESSIONALISM 28, 30 (statement of Harold G.
Clarke, Justice, Ga. Supreme Court) ("[E]thical conduct is the minimum standard demanded
of every lawyer while professional conduct is a higher standard that is expected of every
lawyer."); see also Harris, supra note 220.
241. Garrison, supra note 238, at 599.
242. See Judith D. Fischer, Incivility in Lawyers' Writing: Judicial Handling of
Rambo Run Amok, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 365, 366 (2011) ("While it is easy to catalog uncivil
conduct, its opposite, civility, is more difficult to pin down."); Hung, supra note 1, at 113 1.
243 . Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring).
244. Robert N. Sayler, Rambo Litigation: Why Hardball Tactics Don't Work, A.B.A.
J., Mar. 1988, at 79, 79.
245. Id.; E. Norman Veasey, Making it Right-Veasey Plans Action to Reform Lawyer
Conduct, Bus. L. TODAY, Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 42, 42) ("Abusive litigation in the United States
is mostly the product of a lack of professionalism. Lawyers who bring frivolous lawsuits
and lawyers who engage in abusive litigation tactics are unprofessional. They need to be
better regulated by state supreme courts and better controlled by the trial judges who, in turn,
are supervised by state supreme courts."); see also Grinder v. Keystone Health Plan Cent.,
Inc., 580 F.3d 119, 123 (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming an entry of sanctions and expressing
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civility codes by no less than 140 state or local bar associations aids in the attempt to
reach a consensus definition. 24 6 As courts and bar associations look to develop
specific definitions of "civility," they should be cognizant of the distinct nature of the
obligations of civility, specifically how civility differs from ethics and
professionalism. The legal profession is not well-served if civility continues to be a
term whose meaning exists only in the eye of the beholder or whose tenets create
obligations that are inconsistent with a lawyer's preexisting professional obligations.
As set out above, civility is best viewed as a set of core obligations that deal with
what may be described as common sense or manners.2 4 7 Unlike ethical standards,
civility codes are not intended to be a method of disqualification or sanction by a bar
association. Instead, the civility codes are intended to provide guidance to lawyers
regarding how to conduct themselves in dealings with opposing counsel, clients,
courts, and third parties. 248 Their purpose is also to ensure that the image of the legal
process is preserved and respected by the public, and to ensure that disputes are
resolved in a timely, efficient, and cooperative manner.24 9 These obligations are quite
different from both professionalism and ethics.
Civility is often viewed as an element or characteristic of professionalism;
however, civility does not neatly fit within the definition.250 Professionalism
frustration that attorneys for both parties, although experienced litigators, were unable to
agree on minor matters of discovery or cooperate effectively with the district court judge);
Grant v. Omni Health Care Sys. of N.J., Inc., No. 08-306 (RMB/AMD), 2009 WL 3151322,
at *18 (D.N.J. Sept. 24, 2009) (requiring an attorney to personally pay his opposing
counsel's fees and reasoning that, perhaps doing so would "finally put an end to [his]
practice of flouting [court] orders and help him internalize the consequences of flagrantly
ignoring the rules of procedure as well as the rules of professional conduct"); Szoke v.
Geotech Envtl., Inc., No. 09-60077-CIV, 2009 WL 2589149, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 19, 2009)
(disdaining the "shameless mill of needless litigation" and "utter disregard for the standards
of professionalism" displayed by some, and warning that "more severe and permanent
sanctions" will inevitably result from future misconduct); Stephanie Francis Ward,
Sanctioned for 'Disrespect,' A.B.A. J. E-REP., Jan. 26, 2007, available at 6 No. 4 A.B.A. J.
E-Report 2 (Westlaw) (discussing the Utah Supreme Court's refusal to hear an appeal
because the lawyer's briefs contained disrespectful and offensive material).
246. See Ctr. for Prof 1 Responsibility, supra note 17.
247. See Thomas v. Tenneco Packaging Co., 293 F.3d 1306, 1320-21 (11th Cir.
2002)..
248. See discussion supra Part III.A-J (identifying particular core concepts of civility).
249. See discussion supra Part III.A, C, F (identifying particular core concepts of
civility).
250. See Cramton, supra note 230, at 14 (describing civility as a relatively minor
aspect of professionalism that "is not the core of the enterprise" but more "like an elegant
dessert, which dresses up and completes a good meal"); see also Melissa L. Breger et al.,
Teaching Professionalism in Context: Insights from Students, Clients, Adversaries, and
Judges, 55 S.C. L. REV. 303, 306 (2003) ("[P]rofessionalism embraces the realm of ethics,
but also reaches far beyond. Professionalism also encompasses principles of appropriate
attorney conduct and aspirational ideals for an effective advocate, counselor, officer of the
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addresses societal consciousness, and requires consideration of society's interests or
the integrity of legal institutions in the course of lawyer decision-making. While
some civility codes contain a provision emphasizing that civility encompasses a
consideration of a public good,251 the "public good" here is equated with the interests
of the client as opposed to the self-interest of the lawyer.25 2 This is distinct from the
obligations of professionalism, which would require a lawyer to forego the interests
of a client if necessary to respect the fundamental tenets of society.
Civility is also distinct from legal ethics. It is true that extreme incivility can be a
basis for discipline. "[C]onduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation," or "conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of ustice," for
example, violates Rule 8.4 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.2 5 Similarly,
extreme incivility may violate Rule 3.5, which requires decorum in tribunal
proceedings, including depositions.2 5 4 The civility codes may be seen as providing
guidance to lawyers on how to avoid discipline under these rules. However, the
tenets of civility also exist in tension with a lawyer's ethical obligations. Lawyers
accused of incivility cite their ethical obligation to be a zealous advocate for their
client's interest and note that what is incivility in the eyes of one person is zealous
advocacy in the eyes of another.255 This places courts in the "unenviable" position of
having to determine whether particular conduct is to be characterized as advocacy or
incivility:
court, and member of the bar. Although ethical rules provide a minimum level of
professionalism, there is substantial debate over standards of professionalism beyond the
mandatory rules. What may seem like civility to one lawyer may seem like a breach of the
ethical duty of zealous advocacy to another.")
251. See A LAWYER'S CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM OF THE STATE BAR OF ARIZ. subdiv.
D(l) (State Bar of Ariz. 2005) ("1 will remember that, in addition to commitment to my
client's cause, my responsibilities as a lawyer include a devotion to the public good .... );
CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM: LAWYER'S CREED subdiv. E (State Bar of N.M. 1989) ("I will
be mindful of my commitment to the public good. . . .").
252. LAWYER'S CREED & ASPIRATIONAL STATEMENT ON PROFESSIONALISM: GEN.
ASPIRATIONAL IDEALS subdiv. a (State Bar of Ga. 1990) ("As a lawyer, I will aspire ... [t]o
put fidelity to clients and, through clients, to the common good, before selfish interests."); A
LAWYER'S CREED: ASPIRATIONAL IDEALS AS A LAWYER subdiv. a (Miss. Bar Ass'n 1990)
("As a lawyer, I will aspire . . . [t]o put fidelity to clients and, through clients, to the common
good, before my personal interests.").
253. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c), (d) (2009).
254. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.5 cmt. 5; In re Estiverne, 99-0949, pp. 4-
5, 7-8 (La. 9/24/99); 741 So. 2d 649 (suspending a lawyer for one year and a day because he
violated the state equivalent of Model Rules 4.4 and 8.4 when he left a deposition, retrieved
a gun from his car, and threatened to kill opposing counsel after opposing counsel suggested
the two step outside and settle their disagreement "man to man").
255. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. ("As advocate, a lawyer zealously
asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system.").
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We are cognizant of the unique dilemma that sanctions present. On the one
hand, a court should discipline those who harass their opponents and waste
judicial resources by abusing the legal process. On the other hand, in our
adversarial system, we expect a litigant and his or her attorney to pursue a claim
zealously within the boundaries of the law and ethical rules. Given these
interests, determining whether a case or conduct falls beyond the pale is perhaps
one of the most difficult and unenviable tasks for a court.256
This quote nicely demonstrates the unique character of civility. On the one hand, a
lawyer has an ethical obligation to pursue the interests of the client or suffer sanctions
such as discipline or malpractice. On the other hand, over-zealous representation
may lead to sanctions as a violation of the obligation of civility. The Nevada civility
code states this duality clearly (this statement is implicit in most other codes): "I
recognize my conduct is governed by standards of fundamental decency and
courtesy, in addition to the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct." 7 In sum, courts
and lawyers alike should be conscious of the distinction between civility and other
professional responsibilities placed on lawyers and the consequences of these
distinctions.
F Looking Ahead: The Role of Civility as an Element ofProfessional Responsibility
The ten core concepts of civility answer the question asked at the beginning of
the article: what are the distinct obligations of civility? These provisions are distinct
from ethical obligations and professional obligations both in substance (although
there is certainly some overlap) and in enforcement. Ethical violations are enforced
through the traditional disciplinary process, while all but the most extreme violations
of the obligation of civility are enforced by courts. Lawyers should be aware that,
even if a particular jurisdiction has not adopted a civility code, a court could rely on
the provision of a civility code from another jurisdiction to impose the obligation as a
matter of inherent court authority.258 In addition, lawyers should be conscious of the
possibility that uncivil behavior could be used as evidence in an allegation of
malpractice or misconduct.259
256. Schlaifer Nance & Co. v. Estate of Warhol, 194 F.3d 323, 341 (2d Cir. 1999).
257. PLEDGE OF PROFESSIONALISM art. IV, § 4 (Clark Cnty., Nev. Bar Ass'n 1997)
(emphasis added); see also CAL. Arr'Y GUIDELINES OF CIVILITY & PROFESSIONALISM intro.,
para. 3 (State Bar of Cal. 2007) ("These voluntary Guidelines foster a level of civility and
professionalism that exceed the minimum requirements of the mandated Rules of
Professional Conduct as the best practices of civility in the practice of law in California.").
258. See generally sources cited supra note 181 regarding the inherent authority of
courts to sanction attorney incivility.
259. See Roger C. Cramton, Furthering Justice by Improving the Adversary System
and Making Lawyers More Accountable, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1599, 1614 (2002).
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Courts should also be aware of these core obligations of civility. The fact that
issues of civility are addressed by courts, and issues of ethics are addressed by a
central disciplinary body, makes this distinction particularly salient for two reasons.
First, courts continue to have an obligation to report certain unethical conduct to the
appropriate disciplinary body.260 Civility guidelines should not be used as a means to
avoid this obligation, and knowing the difference between the obligations of civility
and legal ethics aids in a determination of the nature of the conduct. Second, courts
enforcing civility through sanction should be particularly careful that they are not
chilling a lawyer's valid advocacy. Identifying the parameters of civility will
hopefully encourage courts to consciously consider whether particular conduct is best
described as a breach of civil conduct or something else (ethics or professionalism).
There is an additional, pragmatic significance to defining civility. Recognizing
that there are commonalities underlying civility codes provides courts with
confidence that obligations placed on attorneys are not unusual or unique. This will
become increasingly relevant as the demand to curb uncivil conduct rises and courts
seek to limit such conduct through the use of inherent powers. Lawyers have the
right to expect that the basic obligations of civility are the same across jurisdictions.
Unlike ethical obligations, some of which vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, there
is an expectation that the obligations of civility are universal in nature and should be
enforced as such.
While these concepts provide a unifying framework for the study of civility, they
also raise issues that are deserving of additional evaluation. First is the need to
identify precisely what conduct crosses the line from effective or zealous advocacy to
uncivil behavior. This is particularly true with regard to those obligations that are
laudable but vague (such as the obligation to engage in "fair" and 'just" litigation
tactics). The concern that the call for civility could operate to chill effective advocacy
is real,261 and those seeking to enforce these standards should be cognizant of this
concern. To this extent, courts should put in writing any specific obligations relating
to civility to ensure that everyone involved in the process is aware of such civility
requirements.
A second, but related, concern is the likely response to the lack of specificity of
some of the concepts. While the concepts of civility are not as broadly written as the
1908 Canons of Ethics-and, in fact, some of the provisions are extraordinarily
specific-there are enough vague provisions that the unwary lawyer can find herself
at the mercy of an idiosyncratic judge's view of civility. It is safe to expect that if
courts are willing to discipline lawyers for lack of civility based on vague provisions,
260. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.15(B) (2008) ("A judge having
knowledge that a lawyer has conunitted a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that
raises a substantial question regarding the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a
lawyer in other respects shall inform the appropriate authority.").
261. See Mark Neal Aaronson, Be Just to One Another: Preliminary Thoughts on
Civility, Moral Character and Professionalism, 8 ST. THoMAs L. REv. 113, 113-15 (1995).
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a demand will arise for more specific delineations. This occurred with the model
rules of ethics and is likely to occur with codes of civility as well. This issue can be
addressed in one of three ways. First, courts can essentially develop a common law
of civility by setting out, on a case-by-case basis, a definition of what is "civil."
Second, the codes themselves can be made more specific and the vague provisions
removed. However, this would defeat the purpose of the civility codes, which is, in
effect, to educate lawyers about these general guidelines. A third option is for state
bar associations to issue ethics opinions related specifically to issues of civility. If this
approach were adopted, both lawyers and courts will benefit from such opinions that,
while not binding on a court, would provide guidance to lawyers and persuasive
authority to courts.
V CONCLUSION
Two questions were proposed at the beginning of this article, the first of which
was to identify the core tenets of civility. The article examined the civility codes of
thirty-two jurisdictions. From these codes, ten core concepts of civility were distilled.
The concepts are the obligation to (1) recognize the importance of keeping
commitments and of seeking agreement and accommodation with regard to
scheduling and extensions; (2) be respectful and act in a courteous, cordial, and civil
manner; (3) be prompt, punctual, and prepared; (4) maintain honesty and personal
integrity; (5) communicate with opposing counsel; (6) avoid actions taken merely to
delay or harass; (7) ensure proper conduct before the court; (8) act with dignity and
cooperation in pre-trial proceedings; (9) act as a role model to client and public and as
a mentor to young lawyers; and (10) utilize the court system in an efficient and fair
manner. These overarching themes provide a much-needed definition of attorney
civility.
The second question was whether civility was distinguished from other
professional obligations of a lawyer, particularly ethics and professionalism.
Examining the history and development of the obligations of legal ethics and
professionalism, the nature of these responsibilities are complementary, but distinct,
from the obligations associated with civility. In short, ethics addresses minimal
obligations placed on lawyers under rules of professional conduct. Professionalism is
identified as a lawyer's obligations to society as a whole, apart from a lawyer's
obligations to her client. Civility is identified as those obligations that lawyers owe to
other lawyers, their clients, and the court generally.
It appears certain that the call for an increase in civility will continue to be an
area of emphasis for bar associations and courts. It is important to understand that
civility, as defined by civility codes, is a duty to conform to a particular type of
conduct. While the justification for adopting these codes may be questioned, what
cannot be questioned is a need to understand what it means to be a "civil" lawyer.
This will assist both lawyers and courts when contemplating particular conduct and
when evaluating such conduct after allegations of incivility are raised.
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